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In this article, we focus on Proclus’ commentary on Plato’s Timaeus (30a3-6) about how the divine 
Demiurge intervenes in matter. It is an interesting extract due to the fact that Proclus manages to 
combine philosophical perspective with theological interpretation and scientific analysis. In the six 
chapters of the article, we present the theory on dualism established by the representatives of 
Middle Platonism, we approach the question of the production of the corporeal hypostases, we 
examine limit and unlimited as productive powers, we explain production in the sense of co-
production as well as why matter without qualities is excluded from the entire procedure, and we 
discuss the principle of the supremacy of the supreme Principle. The most important conclusion 
drawn according to Proclus, who adopts moderate skepticism, is that, although in his early 
dialogues Plato tends to dualism, he does this for methodological purposes, for Plato’s views are 






One of the main characteristics of Neoplatonism was the effort to re-establish –
under the new terms and conditions which emerged in the meantime as a result of the 
development of the history of thought and investigation– the Platonic –and everything that 
was meanwhile formed: that is the Aristotelian– philosophy in the field of Cosmology. As 
it was inevitable, the revival would be affected by the middle philosophical tradition and 
the new tendencies that were gradually formed by the representatives of this School. For 
example, the metaphysical orientation that had dominated since the second century BC had 




an impact on the questions about the creation, structure, and function of the natural world.1 
Philosophical reflection, despite the fact that it kept strong rational elements, was orientated 
towards theology as well, leading to a growth of the teleological interpretative models.2 As 
expected, the relevant conceptual systems were enriched and any former concept received a 
new meaning. This was a different world from that of the classical or first post-classical 
antiquity. The difference was obvious on interpretation and scientific investigation, which 
during the Hellenistic period was fascinating, mostly in the fields of Physics and 
Mathematics. So, personalities like Plotinus, Porphyry and Iamblichus a) had already 
composed the past tradition, b) had reconstructed it in some critical points, and c) had 
suggested new methods for approaching it. For instance, the leader of Neoplatonism, 
Plotinus, had devoted his second Ennead in cosmological questions, while the fifth and the 
sixth in metaphysical topics, which however defined the cosmological. Although in these 
works Plato and Aristotle are extensively utilized, his direction can be more or less placed 
in a new theoretical spirit. He contends that the supreme ontological reality is the One-
Good, which defines in an extreme structural accuracy both the metaphysical and physical 
procedures. Its emanation gradually causes the Intellect, the direct product of which is the 
archetypal Platonic Ideas, and the Soul, which is divided into two parts, the superior and the 
inferior, and constitutes the middle between the metaphysical and natural world. It is the 
direct productive cause of matter, which is not self-produced but a product. So, according 
to the leader of Neoplatonism, all sensible beings receive their being from the fact that they 
participate in Ideas, namely the products of the Intellect. In a more analytical perspective, 
this participation is due to the projection of the Ideas in the Soul of the world, as seminal 
reasons. These reasons are divided into superior and inferior ones. The superior reasons are 
 
1 A particularly interesting collection of studies recently published on this, with an emphasis on 
Proclus, is the following: Butorac, David & Layne, Danielle, Proclus and his Legacy (Berlin-
Boston 2017). 
2 For a general approach of the new tendencies, cf. Saffrey, Henri-Dominique. Recherches sur le 
Néoplatonisme après Plotin (Paris 1990). In the concentric chapters of this study, there is an 
excellent combination of the historical with the systematic perspective, which allows to explore 
how the conceptual schemata and the explanations are formed, at least from Iamblichus to 
Damascius, in the context of a Greek cultural environment that was in close communication with 
Eastern religious-philosophical Schools and had proposed new compositions, which actually 
appeared in the sense of how they could be applied in both the cult procedures and the daily moral 
actions, which mostly rely on Theoretical Reason.  




part of the best part of the Soul, that is to say, that which faces the Intellect and the One. 
The inferior seminal reasons are placed in Nature –through the inferior part of the Soul– 
and particularize the original supreme emanation of the One. But, Plotinus considers this 
particularization as a completely opposite condition to the One, as its radical otherness, 
since the natural universe has not originally assimilated the illuminations of the One. 
Regardless of this –at least first– axiological relegation of the natural world, the One is the 
primary cause, which means that we can from now on refer to what is defined as monism.   
Under these circumstances, Proclus the Neoplatonist (412-485) attempted to 
comment and interpret the Platonic dialogues.3 In fact, he synthesized philosophical 
perspective with theological explanation and scientific analysis, in a way that, despite the 
epistemological difficulties he had to face, was impressive and could be easily described as 
a sort of research modernism. He presented this synthetic –but not paratactic– approach 
mostly –comparing with the rest of his works– in his major treatise entitled In Platonis 
Timaeum commentaria.4 This treatise can be easily considered as the most important work 
–not only of the Neoplatonic School– on Cosmology or metaphysics of immanence –as 
well as on Natural Science and Mathematics. It is to be mentioned that in his view matter 
and the natural world are positive things, since they are the products of the good volition of 
gods and they are explicitly approached in a teleological way. In this article, we will 
analyze his comments on the following extract of the Platonic dialogue Timaeus, where 
there is a description of how the divine Demiurge intervenes in matter, a question which is 
approached by Proclus in the three perspectives mentioned before –as a part of his theory 
about the progression from metaphysics of transcendence to metaphysics of immanence: 
οὕτω δὴ πᾶν ὅσον ἦν ὁρατὸν παραλαβὼν οὐχ ἡσυχίαν ἄγον ἀλλὰ κινούμενον πλημμελῶς 
καὶ ἀτάκτως, εἰς τάξιν αὐτὸ ἤγαγεν ἐκ τῆς ἀταξίας, ἡγησάμενος ἐκεῖνο τούτου πάντως 
 
3 Proclus has also commented on Plato’s Alc.1, Cra., Prm., R., Ti. 
4 Cf. Bastid, Paul. Proclus et le crépuscule de la pensée grecque (Paris 1969), pp. 119-207. This 
study presents the main points of Proclus’ commentary on the extract, while, in some cases, it also 
stresses the basic details of his particular subject matters, which are actually best known for their 
originality in relation to the Neoplatonic past. An extensive monograph on the whole Commentary 
on Timaeus remains a desideratum, in order his epistemological foundations and research goals to 
be scientifically presented. André-Jean Festugière’s as well as David Theunis Runia’s and Michael 
Share’s comments included in the relevant translations of this great text are quite important, for they 
provide great historical and systematic information for a better understanding. Note that both the 
translations, in French and English, are important for understanding the text.  




ἄμεινον.5 “He found everything visible in a state of turmoil, moving in a discordant and 
chaotic manner, so he led it from chaos to order, which he regarded as in all ways better”.6 
The most important point of this comment is that Proclus intends to prove that approaching 
this Platonic extract under the terms and conditions of ontological dualism does not 
correspond to its true content.   
 
1. The theoretical perspective on dualism of Middle Platonism 
 
Proclus begins his comments with Plutarch’s and Atticus’ positions7 on that 
unordered matter pre-exists prior to the ordered, regular and formed structure of it.8 
 
5 Cf. Timaeus, 30a.3-6. 
6 Cf. Waterfield, Robin (trans.) and Gregory, Alex (intr.-notes), Plato: Timaeus and Critias 
(Oxford-New York 2008), p. 18. Gregory contends that according to Plato “prior to the intervention 
of the Demiurge, there is chaos. The Demiurge will not only establish order, but will also generate 
harmony in the cosmos”, as well as that “a basic assumption throughout Timaeus is that order is 
better than chaos” (ibid., 127), both ontologically and axiologically. Cf. Festugière, André-Jean. La 
Révélation d’Hermès Trismégiste, (Paris 1990), pp.106-108. From the cosmological point of view, 
this is a very interesting passage. The crucial part is «ὅσον ἦν ὁρατόν». It is the process to render 
sensible, which relates only with what God is able to conceive, for humans had not yet been 
produced. Note that the word «ὁρατόν» describes what is potentially sensible. But, is it possible this 
view to reduce God’s gnoseological capacity? Now, new questions arise. For instance: a) why past 
continuous («ἦν») and not present continuous («ἐστί»)? β) Is it possible to relate sensory perception 
with the divine, which for Plato is constantly intelligible (both ontologically and gnoseologically), 
i.e., as being independent from any physical-natural procedures? We should also keep in mind that 
the founder of the Academy uses metaphorical language and that is why it is necessary to decode it 
both scientifically and philosophically.  
7 Ιt is not clear here whether Proclus implies just the theories of these two thinkers or a circle which 
supported them. There was possibly a tradition that was based on the ontological dualism, which 
gradually and mainly after Middle Platonism changes. It should be also mentioned that the temporal 
priority of the unordered matter over the ordered one does not necessarily result in dualism, for it is 
quite possible that there are two different levels in which either the Demiurge intervenes or the 
divine properties are assimilated. In fact, this is probably the distinction from which Proclus’ 
elaboration that we will analyze begins. About Philo, cf. the extremely analytical description of A. 
J. Festugière, La Révélation d’Hermès Trismégiste, pp. 521-605. 
8 In the ancient text, we find the phrase “ἀπὸ χρόνου”, obviously because according to Proclus time 
comes into existence together with cosmos, although in the second book of his comments on 
Timaeus the philosopher gives little priority to time, which is presented as a spiritual power of the 
natural world. Or, in more technical terms, he considers time as the cosmological factor that makes 
able nature to manifest and utilize its capabilities, in the developmental sense of teleology, which is 
not an automatic procedure. However, this expression causes some problems, both textual and 
systematic, such as a) it does not explicitly appear in Plutarch’s text and b) it is not clear whether it 
indicates a starting point of a pre-existing time. This pre-existence appears even if we translate the 




Intending to give also emphasis to the entire axiological question related to the nature of the 
cosmological procedures with respect to their starting points and successions, he also says 
that according to Plutarch it is important to keep in mind the distinction arisen from the 
Platonic Laws9 between the “maleficent” and the “boniform” Souls.10 Either way, Plato 
proves throughout the entire reasoning (to 899d) that boniform Soul (including its 
separations) is the ontological factor that regulates the natural world and its movements11, a 
 
expression as “one moment in time”. The question here is as follows: did time pre-exist while there 
was disorder?  
9 Cf. Plato, Leges, X, 897b. According to Plato’s text: «…καὶ πᾶσιν οἷς ψυχὴ χρωμένη, νοῦν μὲν 
προσλαβοῦσα ἀεὶ θεὸν ὀρθῶς θεοῖς, ὀρθὰ καὶ εὐδαίμονα παιδαγωγεῖ πάντα, ἀνοίᾳ δὲ συγγενομένη 
πάντα αὖ τἀναντία τούτοις ἀπεργάζεται». In a broader sense, Plato seems to recognize that Soul not 
only has cosmological capabilities but also personal-intentional properties, with actually 
educational foundations; a metaphorical meaning, here too, is a fact. Proclus explains: «εἴρηται 
γοῦν ἐν Νόμοις τὴν μὲν ἀγαθοειδῆ ψυχὴν ὀρθὰ καὶ ἔμφρονα παιδαγωγεῖν, τὴν δὲ κακεργέτιν 
ἀτάκτως τε κινεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ ὑπ' αὐτῆς διοικούμενον πλημμελῶς ἄγειν». It is quite interesting that 
the Neoplatonic scholarch uses the term “ἔμφρονα” instead of “εὐδαίμονα”, which, as Runia and 
Share point out, is something that he also does in De mal. subs, 27.12 [cf. Proclus: Commentary on 
Plato’s Timaeus, II, Book 2: Proclus on the Causes of the Cosmos and its Creation, Runia, David 
Theunia – Share, Michael (trans.-intr.-notes), New York 2008, p. 250]. It could be said that 
“εύδαιμονία” is for him a more general term than the condition of “ἔμφρονα”, which basically owns 
exclusively logical features, that is, it is a logical structure of ranks and procedures for reaching 
eventually “εύδαιμονία”, in the sense of the most important “ὁμοίωσις” of the sensible world with 
God. It should be also mentioned that the distinction between the two souls in Plato could be 
considered as the basis of how the Soul appears in Plotinus, which we briefly presented in our 
introduction. 
10 Cf. In Platonis Timaeum Commentaria, II, 381.26-382.7. In fact, Plutarch says that this 
(maleficent) Soul will later participate in the Intellect, Reason and Prudence and will receive these 
properties, so that god will turn it into the leading power of the natural world. It is the moment at 
which matter will be also transformed into something new, so that to contribute to the production of 
the world. Now, this new state has nothing to do with its original state, which was in a complete 
disorder. Proclus makes matter able for particular actions, which though do not explicitly appear in 
Plutarch’s text. We shall present more systematically these positions in the main text.     
11 Cf. for instance, A. J. Festugière, La Révélation d’Hermès Trismégiste, pp. 123-128. It is 
important to keep in mind Proclus’ comment that here Plato does not mean matter; he actually 
refers to a more developed cosmological condition. On this: “Si la matière si meut d’elle-même, s’il 
n’est de mouvement que par une âme, ne faut-il par concevoir une Ame de la matière, et, 
nécessairement, puisque les mouvements de la matière sont désordonnés, une Ame mauvaise? Ainsi 
raisonne Wilamowitz (1). Le malheur est que notre morceau des Lois (896 c 6- 898 c 8) ne fait 
aucune mention de la matière, bien que cette mention paraisse absolument indispensable si l’on 
maintient la coexistence des deux principes: dans ce case en effet, le seul moyen d’expliquer l’Ame 
mauvaise est de l’identifier à la matière (2). Platon ne devait-il pas le dire, ou au moins l’insinuer?” 
(p. 127). Therefore, maleficent Soul is not excluded, for it explains the original disorder of matter. 
On the other hand, is it possible this negative –as Festugière’s remarks support this meaning– term 
to depend on the procedures of the natural world, which has not yet completely assimilated what the 
Soul, which carries the whole metaphysical planning, has provided? In other words, is there a 




point that is attempted to be proved by direct sensory observation as well. The Neoplatonic 
philosopher, however, will attempt to elaborate these views or, at least, to put them in a 
broader perspective, despite the fact that Plutarch’s and Atticus’ suggestions do not seem to 
be at a first glance different from what is written in the Platonic text. His main principle 
will obviously be that matter does not exist on its own, but it is produced by metaphysical 
powers or divine beings which are gathered together in order to perform production by 
following a particular plan. So, he explicitly and by definition tends to ontological monism 
and his different position from the Platonic dualistic example appears to be crucial, 
although later he will clearly follow a different analysis and different arguments compared 
to those which he believes that Plato follows.   
It is interesting that the reasoning process to be followed by Proclus to reconstruct 
the positions of the philosophers to whom he refers, is, as in all of his treatises, typical of 
his great methodological accuracy.12 In order to establish even more the systematic way in 
which he organizes his reasoning, he uses relevant topics of the History of Philosophy. So, 
following the structures of his argumentation, we could contend that they are coherent 
arguments, which leads us in that he is a consistent scientist. He applies these instruments 
quite consistently to support the theory of monism. The preceding Neoplatonic 
philosophers and especially his teacher Syrianus were also supporters of this theory. But, 
Proclus broadens the foundations of monism, by introducing new philosophical bases or 
renewing the former ones. By following the preceding philosophers, he presents a 
metaphysical world which is the only productive cause of the natural world. He organizes 
the metaphysical world in an extremely accurate way, mostly according to the theory on 
 
transition of a property or state from the effect to its cause? Or, is Soul a negative reality due to the 
fact that it did not originally intervene in a crucial way? There could be many other questions with 
no appropriate or valid answers. This multi-potentiality is quite obvious, which proves that a deep 
inquiry that is attempted. Note that Plutarch in a following comment –to which Proclus will refer 
immediately after– says once again that the Soul pre-existed in an unordered and unconceivable 
condition and that after the intervention of the divine Demiurge was put in order and received great 
productive capabilities. We should mention though that how the maleficent Soul will be explained 
is necessarily also defined by what is the example adopted, monism or dualism.  
12 This methodology not only is strictly part of Proclus’ theory but also reveals the leading 
exponents of formal Logic, such as Aristotle, Speusippus and Porphyry. About how Proclus utilizes 
these thinkers and mostly Porphyry, cf. the following study: Smith, Andrew. “Porphyre and the 
Platonic Theology”, in: A. Ph. Segonds and C. Steel, Proclus et la Théologie Platonicienne (Paris 
2000), pp.177-188. 




henads, which gives him the opportunity to preserve the ontological distinction between 
Metaphysics of transcendence and Metaphysics of immanence. He presents henads as the 
productive energies and powers of the first Cause, that is, the One-Good, through which he 
organizes the entire metaphysical system, which does not directly communicate with this 
Principle, for it communicates with it only through henads.13   
  
2. The question of the production of the corporeal hypostases  
 
At the beginning of his analysis Proclus describes the way in which the Platonic 
point of view is presented by Plutarch and Atticus. Proclus explains that according to them 
matter, during being ordered by the Demiurge himself, starts to follow a specific procedure 
–obviously for the formation of the cosmos. Extending this, we could say that they actually 
admit that matter is gradually activated so as to contribute, as far as this is possible, to the 
production and form exemplification of the sensible world. Thus, according to their 
dualistic example they adopt, matter is not considered as a passive condition, at least from 
one point onwards, but as possessing intention and active acceptability. On the other hand, 
they make a comment about the improvement of the products that an originally negative 
ontological condition causes. According to them, a maleficent Soul, certainly not in its 
original state or while being unordered, becomes able to appear in a positive way. 
Specifically, since it participates in the Intellect, it can be included in a new positive state 
after the interventions that it accepts by the Demiurge, which are utilized in an opposite to 
its nature way. By extension, it makes the movement of the natural world rational and 
ordered. Therefore, the fact that matter is ordered is due to its participation in Form, while 
the fact that the Soul is ordered, regardless of how it is evaluated, is due to the fact that it is 
full of the presence of Intellect.14 That is to say, these two realities, which are considered to 
be essential factors for the formation of the natural world, are not on their own capable of 
adjusting, organizing and forming themselves. They need a superior reality to interfere or 
 
13 Proclus elaborates the topic of henads in Inst., props. 113-165 and in the first six chapters of the 
third book of Theol. Pl. For a thorough and systematic approach, cf. the Introduction of this book by 
Saffrey, Henri-Dominique and Westerink, Leendert Gerrit (Paris 1978, IX-CXIV).   
14 Concerning Atticus’ positions cf. fragm.23; concerning Plutarch’s positions, cf. his treatise De 
an. Proc., 1014 B – 1016 C. 




give assistance to them. In addition, exactly by participating in superior to them realities, 
they eliminate any negative or unordered characteristic they would possibly possess as a 
result of their original unordered state. Proclus’ view is initially quite clear: both the 
unordered matter and the maleficent Soul are prior to the ordering and, therefore, we could 
argue that according to his view dualism is taken for granted. From this point onwards, 
however, his goal is to use the appropriate argumentation to disprove it.    
Although he does not state clearly his agreement or disagreement on this –and 
despite the fact that he obviously does not adopt the dualistic example, so there is actually 
an indirect answer– the Neoplatonic philosopher mentions that he could never accept the 
idea of a special kind of priorities or developments in the sense that suggested by Plutarch 
and Atticus. He actually stresses that those who follow Porphyry and Iamblichus15, who are 
 
15 These views are mentioned is the passage 382.7-12. Information about Porphyry’s worldview can 
be found in Philoponus Aet., where he says the following: «οὐ γὰρ ἴδιον τοῦτο τοῦ παντὸς 
πρόβλημα, καθὸ πᾶν ἐστιν, λέγω δὴ τοῦ κόσμου, εἰ ἐξ ὕλης καὶ εἴδους ἔχει τὴν σύστασιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ 
τοῦ τυχόντος καὶ μερικοῦ σώματος γενητοῦ τε καὶ φθαρτοῦ, οἷον τοῦδε τοῦ ὕδατος καὶ τῆσδε τῆς 
γῆς. Ὅτι δὲ τοῦτό ἐστιν ἀληθές, μάρτυς καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ Πορφύριος· καίτοι γὰρ εἰπὼν γενητὸν λέγεσθαι 
τὸν κόσμον ὡς σύνθετον ἐξ ὕλης καὶ εἴδους προελθὼν καὶ ἐξηγούμενος τὸ ’παραλαβὼν ὁ θεὸς ὅσον 
ἦν ὁρατὸν οὐχ ἡσυχίαν ἄγον ἀλλὰ πλημμελῶς καὶ ἀτάκτως κινούμενον’ φησὶν ἐπὶ λέξεως ταῦτα 
‘οὐκ ἔστιν ταὐτὸν κόσμου ποίησις καὶ σώματος ὑπόστασις οὐδὲ αἱ αὐταὶ ἀρχαὶ σώματός τε καὶ 
κόσμου, ἀλλ' ἵνα μὲν κόσμος γένηται, δεῖ σώματα εἶναι καὶ θεὸν εἶναι, ἵνα δὲ σώματα, δεῖ ὕλην 
εἶναι καὶ θεὸν καὶ τὸ ἐπιγινόμενον ἄλλο μέν, ἵνα σωματωθῇ ὕλη, ἄλλο δέ, ἵνα τὰ σωματωθέντα 
ταχθῇ» (164.8-23). [“And why does he conduct his investigation as though it relates [only] to the 
universe as a whole? The problem as to whether it is constructed of matter and form is not one that 
is peculiar to the universe (that is, the world) qua universe but one that arises in relation to any and 
every individual corporeal object that is generated and perishable, as for instance a particular 
volume of water or earth. Porphyry himself is a witness that this is true. Although he has previously 
stated that the world is said to be generated in that it is composed of matter and form, later, when 
commenting on the words ‘the god, taking over all that was visible, not at rest but moving in a 
discordant and disorderly manner’, he, to quote his exact words, writes this: The making of the 
world and the creation of body are not the same thing, nor are the beginnings of body and of the 
world the same. For the world to come to be, both bodies and God must exist, for bodies to, there 
must be matter, God, and supervening [form] (one lot so that the matter may become body, and 
another to give order to the things that have become body)”. (Philoponus: Against Proclus on the 
Eternity of the World 6-8, v.2, trans. by M. Share, London-New York 2005, pp. 39-40)] The main 
point here is the difference between the integrity of macrocosm and the corruption of microcosm, 
which would be interesting for modern natural scholars, for it raises the question about the 
incorruptibility of matter. From Philoponus’ point of view, we draw the following as well: the 
cosmological process as a demiurgic development requires the original existence of both god and 
the bodies, which are formed by the way in which god encounters matter, since he provides it with 
qualities-properties-laws-functions, which possibly contain energy. The next phase is how the 
expressed through the bodies matter will gain order in a holistic sense. Particularly interesting is 
that the emerging forms of matter are placed in an ordered structure, in order macrocosmic ordered 
reality to come into existence. For the time being, two are the questions: a) what is the relation 





between god and the Forms, both per se and with respect to their ordering interference? b) What is 
the difference between a hypostasis (which is associated with a body) and production (which is 
associated with the cosmos)? According to the context, the order in which the bodies are set –
obviously by the divine planning– is the state of production, which is supervenient and serves a 
particular set of goals and objectives. The main, however, question, which has not been yet solved, 
is the following: does matter pre-exist or not?  In another passage, Philoponus says about Proclus 
the following: «ὅθεν κινεῖσθαι μέν φησιν τὴν ὕλην ὡς ἤδη τὰ ἴχνη τῶν εἰδῶν δεξαμένην, 
πλημμελῶς δὲ καὶ ἀτάκτως, κινεῖσθαι δ' αὐτὸ τὸ ἀτελὲς τῆς εἰδοποιίας καὶ ἀδιάρθρωτον· εἰ γὰρ τῷ 
τεταγμένῳ τὸ ἄτακτον ἀντίκειται καὶ τῷ τελείῳ τε καὶ διηρθρωμένῳ τὸ ἀτελές τε καὶ ἀδιάρθρωτον, 
τὰ δὲ τέλεια εἴδη τῆς τεταγμένης κινήσεώς ἐστιν αἴτια, καὶ τὰ ἀδιάρθρωτα ἄρα καὶ ἀτελῆ καὶ οἱονεὶ 
ἴχνη τῶν τελείων τῆς ἀτάκτου κινήσεως αἴτια ἔσται. Ταύτας οὖν τὰς ὑποθέσεις λαβὼν ὁ Πρόκλος ὁ 
καὶ πρὸ τούτων δείξας ἐν ἀρχῇ τοῦ λόγου, ὡς καὶ αὐτὴν τὴν ὕλην ὁ τοῦ κόσμου δημιουργὸς καὶ 
τεχνίτης ἐποίησεν, ἐπεὶ καὶ πᾶς τεχνίτης αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ τὴν οἰκείαν ὕλην παρασκευάζει, καὶ ὅτι καὶ 
τὰ πρόδρομα πάλιν τῶν εἰδῶν ἴχνη, ἐξ ὧν πλημμελῶς καὶ ἀτάκτως κινουμένη γέγονεν ἡ ὕλη, αὐτὸς 
ἐν αὐτῇ ὁ τῆς ὕλης δημιουργὸς ὑπέστησεν, συλλογίζεται ἐφεξῆς, ὡς οὐχ οἷόν τέ ἐστιν κατὰ χρόνον 
ταῦτα ἀλλήλων διακεκρίσθαι, ὡς πρώτην μὲν τὴν ἀνείδεον ὕλην ὑφίστασθαι, εἶτα ἐφεξῆς αὐτῇ τὰ 
ἴχνη τῶν εἰδῶν ἐντίθεσθαι καὶ τρίτον τὸ ἄτακτον κοσμεῖσθαί τε καὶ τάττεσθαι, χωρὶς εἰ μὴ τῇ 
ἐπινοίᾳ, φησίν, ταῦτά τις ἀπ' ἀλλήλων χωρίζοι» (542.25-543.20). [“Hence, on the one hand, he says 
that matter moves in a discordant and disorderly manner since it has already received the traces of 
the forms, but, on the other hand, he says that what moves is the incomplete and inarticulate 
precursor of the production of forms. For if what is disordered is opposed to what is ordered and 
what is incomplete and inarticulate to what is complete and articulated, and if the complete forms 
are causes of ordered motion, then the inarticulate and incomplete forms – traces, as it were, of the 
complete forms – are causes of incomplete motion. By making these assumptions, then, Proclus, 
who even before, at the start of his argument, had shown both that the creator and craftsman of the 
cosmos also made the matter itself (since every craftsman prepares his own appropriate matter for 
himself), and that the creator of the matter Himself caused the precursors of the forms, i.e. the traces 
from which matter came to be moving in a discordant and disorderly manner, next infers that it is 
impossible for these states to be temporally distinguished from one another so that the matter 
without form would exist first, and next the traces of the forms would then be placed in it, and 
thirdly what is disordered [viz. the matter plus the traces] would be ordered and arranged – unless, 
he says, one separates them from one another in thought” (Philoponus: Against Proclus on the 
Eternity of the World 12-18, v.3, trans. by J. Wilberding, London-New York 2006, 57)]. The second 
text reveals the procedure during which the Demiurge produces both matter and the traces of the 
Forms as prior states of their complete presence, that is, not capable yet of forming with productive-
paradigmatic automatic procedures the perfect order, which will come in a following phase, which 
though is not a later provision, as a metaphysical bestowment, than the traces. Or, to be more 
accurate, this is a divine specification which gradually leads matter to its perfection. It should be 
also said that matter gradually assimilates what has received from the Forms. Therefore, the 
question is whether Proclus makes this distinction exclusively for theoretical-analytical reasons. A 
crucial ontological point in the distinction between monism and dualism is how “πᾶς τεχνίτης αὐτὸς 
ἑαυτῷ τὴν οἰκείαν ὕλην παρασκευάζει” will be explained, where the terms “ἑαυτῷ” and “οἰκείαν” 
raise questions about the co-existence of the Demiurge with matter. If co-existence was accepted, 
matter would not originally be subject to time, but only in a later phase at which modulation begins. 
This question needs further discussion and will investigate it by following Proclus’ passage. A 
strong possibility is also that Philoponus exercises a sort of strict criticism in Proclus, so that he 
derives some conclusions which do not come from the texts. The fact that he is a Christian leads 
him probably to do so. Another thing to be investigated is whether the judgments of those who 
follow Porphyry and Iamblichus correspond to what Proclus says, as well as whether the three 




not named here, are clearly opposed to this view, namely to that the disordered comes 
before the ordered –temporarily speaking, although time is not literally meant here, for it is 
considered that is goes together with the order of the world–, the incomplete comes before 
the complete and the unintelligent comes before the intelligent.16 At this point, he suggests 
indirectly but also clearly ontological monism, in the sense of a developmental process that 
aims at something better. He also stresses that the philosophers who are criticized attempt 
to apply their position not only on what takes place in the natural world but also on the 
productive procedures that the Demiurge himself performs. So the question here is why the 
Demiurge would decide to perform this procedure suggested by Plutarch and Atticus? 
Having in mind some of the remarks presented by Philoponus in some of his extracts 
mentioned in a previous note the answer could be that the Demiurge originally produces 
matter as an instrument to form later the natural world according to that complete 
cosmological manner which is required. The important thing to stress here is that this 
development does not introduce a sort of transitivity within the Demiurge who is eternal, 
but it is associated with what takes place in the new level which will fall under the terms of 
time-becoming, in the sense of a gradually improving modulation. It is highly possible that 
matter also participates in the process of its world formation, which results in that teleology 
turns into a complex process in which the recipient of the divine energies participates. What 
is the degree of the actual initiative and responsibility of matter in a monistic system is a 
question.  
Coming back to the text, it is to be said that Proclus’ criticism, which has historical 
foundations, is explicit and relies on the Demiurge’s ontological nature and how he 
considers him as an eternal divine-metaphysical being free from any ad extra necessities. 
 
philosophers, who follow the same tradition, as it is mentioned for strengthening the whole 
argument, follow the same direction on the topic discussed as well.  
16 Cf. In Platonis Timaeus commentaria, II, 382.12-16: Οἱ δὲ περὶ Πορφύριον καὶ Ἰάμβλιχον ταύτην 
μὲν ἐπιρραπίζουσι τὴν δόξαν ὡς τὸ ἄτακτον πρὸ τοῦ τεταγμένου καὶ τὸ ἀτελὲς πρὸ τοῦ τελείου καὶ 
πρὸ τοῦ νοεροῦ τὸ ἀνόητον ἐν τοῖς ὅλοις ἀποτιθεμένην». “Those around Porphyry and Iamblichus 
castigate this position on the grounds that it puts the disordered before the ordered, the incomplete 
before the complete and the unintelligent before the intelligent in the universe” (Runia – Share, p. 
250). Special attention should be given in the phrase “ἐν τοῖς ὅλοις”, which can have two meanings: 
a) all things and beings which constitute together universe, b) all those beings each of which is a 
whole, that is, its nature is hypostatically complete and it possesses the characteristics of 
macrocosm. The second option could not be confirmed; for, otherwise, it would result is 
unexplainable separations of the natural world. 




Specifically, according to him, the thinkers with whom he disagrees do not accept or, at 
least, put some restrictions to the Demiurge’s boniform will and productive power, which 
are considered by him as completely independent of any external intervention. As he 
further explains, if those two factors coincide as they project together, what unavoidably 
arises is that the natural world is eternally created by the Demiurge, for this is an 
appropriate function to his ontological nature as a god. Now, the question is whether the 
term ‘eternally’ shows a way of manifestation with particular features defined by its very 
nature or a co-existence of the cause with the effect. For the time being, there is no answer 
according to the text; however, do keep in mind that the second case can result in 
pantheism, which Proclus totally rejects. Otherwise, there would be no significant 
difference between the metaphysical and the natural world, at the same time as the former 
would absorb, at least to some extent, the latter.17 
In this extract, Proclus puts under consideration or expresses skepticism about the 
idea of an original incomplete creation. His rationale is clear and comes from the 
ontological-axiological meaning that he attributes to the metaphysical world. Thus, if 
incompleteness was accepted, the divine creation would need additional interventions. The 
result would be inevitable: the quality of the Demiurge would be also considered as 
incomplete, at least in the sense of him being a cause, or even worse with respect to his 
self-founding condition. Or, else, the Neoplatonic philosopher directly exercises his 
criticism to show through successive arguments that it is not possible the Demiurge as a 
god or as a metaphysical being to act in incomplete ways. His energy, as well as both its 
projection and, eventually, its effects, is exactly what his substance is. By extension, it 
 
17 Cf. In Platonis Timaeum commentaria, B, 382.17-20. In Plato’s Laws, 897a-c, one can identify 
some similarities with Aristotle’s Ontology. Plato seems that he adds a sort of active intention to 
matter, which makes it able to receive the formative interference by the Demiurge and to utilize it. 
He does not consider it to be something unresponsive, since he says that it participates to the 
interventions of the Soul, at least in a later point of time, in the context of the dominant dualism. 
And participation is no more something passive, as it was in his first dialogues. Cf. also A. J. 
Festugière, La Révélation d’Hermès Trismégiste, v. ΙΙ, p. 124: “Ce à quoi l’Étranger répond lui-
même: Si l’ensemble de la course du Ciel et son mouvement de translation ainsi que celui de tous 
les êtres célestes manifeste une resemblance de nature avec le mouvement, la révolution et les 
calculs raisonnés de l’intellect et s’y apparente dans sa marche, c’est évidemment de l’Ame la 
meilleure qu’il faut dire qu’elle prend soin du monde entier et qu’elle le mène par une semblance 
voie. Si au contraire la marche du monde est folle et sans ordre, c’est l’Ame mauvaise qui le mène 
(897 c 4 - d 1)”. 




could be actually argued that Syrianus’ student does not define the quality of the Demiurge 
by relying on how the effects of his activity temporarily appear. The developing effect is 
not a safe criterion for describing the ontological nature of the cause and the principle of 
analogy is also not sufficient, for initially it necessarily remains in general conclusions.  
Another question is whether the Demiurge produces the natural world eternally or 
he starts from a particular moment of time. The answer to this is actually related to the 
answer to the former question about whether the two factors associated causally exist 
eternally together and in what terms. Pantheism appears as a strong possibility. That is to 
say, if we accepted that the natural world pre-exists since the beginning in the form of seeds 
within the Demiurge, we would be led on that it holds original divine properties, which 
would put it higher to the ontological-axiological scale. However, regardless of the final 
conclusions to be drawn by Proclus’ explanations, we have to explain that the adverb 
“eternally”, which suggests great ontological features in Proclus’ texts, means, at least, that 
the creation is defined by powers of an unchangeable completeness, which do not change. 
They are always the same either per se or after their manifestation, regardless of how they 
appear or how they are activated by a particular body through a receptive participation.  
Following Porphyry’s and Iamblichus’ critical approaches, Proclus then presents 
another judgement about these two thinkers, which, by excluding the ontological and 
rational impasses, works as an argument for revealing what the actual condition of matter 
would be if it was approached independently of the divine interventions. Specifically, they 
first of all contend that Plato intended to present with strong arguments both the providence 
that comes from the Demiurge and covers the whole world and the bounties which are 
provided by the Intellect and the Soul. Although this position is clearly a theory of Plato, it 
does not actually explain the relation between the Intellect and the Demiurge. According to 
Proclus, the valid criteria appear if we extend this discussion. To give emphasis to the 
metaphysical properties, Porphyry and Iamblichus contend that according to Plato those 
found in the natural world as causes that hold the property of goodness, could, theoretically, 
be removed, which would make possible to investigate the corporeal formation in its 
absolute integrity. Both of them appear as making their evaluations relying on the effect 
that is caused by the metaphysical interventions, which, due to its origin, is considered to 
be perfect. They actually believe that the axiological priority of the divine gifts over a 




possible pure corporeality becomes clear the moment at which its formation is completed. 
Then, it will be possible to understand the inferiority of the discordant and unordered, 
which are considered as impermanent conditions.18 We could also argue that their purpose 
is to define the successive improving levels of the production process, provided that the 
divine creative gifts, as energy fields, are constantly manifested and successively contribute 
to the emergence of new corporeal conditions with ordered qualities. We could also add 
that this manifestation was provided only once and that it was successively received and 
projected in an ontological and evaluative good manner, which is strengthened mostly by 
the immanence of the divine goods. What is described here obviously gives assistance to 
Proclus to continue his criticism of Plutarch and Atticus.     
Specifically, as these theories are re-approached, Proclus stresses that according to 
their rationale, Porphyry and Iamblichus think that it is important to explain the nature of 
the corporeal in its hypothetical original state and what organization it originally received 
from the creative process. Two are the requirements for this investigation: a) the first one 
relates with the answer of whether the natural world exists eternally as potentiality before to 
appear through improving ascents as a reality and b) the second one is based on whether 
human mind, how and from what point, separates the creator from his effect. Another 
question is whether by this separation, he actually introduces production in time together 
with everything that exists as seeds and expresses a new produced thing. These distinctions 
come from the fact that anything generated is composite19, while the Demiurge, as a 
metaphysical being, is simple. It is important here to explain the meaning of this co-
existence of the factors that potentially contribute to the production process at the same 
time as we need to define the ontological point after which it takes place. Indirectly, it 
arises that in monism time must have been produced in the first place in relation to the 
space of the natural world, since ordering is not a subsequent action but a revelation of a 
primary capability.  
Provided that what has been already elaborated is true, Proclus mentions that 
another important thing to be added is that, from the cosmological point of view, demiurgic 
 
18 Cf. In Platonis Timaeum commentaria, II, 382.21-383.1. 
19 It is to be mentioned that exactly because a generated is originally composite, it is divisible into 
its components only in a theoretical-notional (or even mathematical) sense but not in a physical one, 
which was not feasible for the capabilities of that period of time.  




productive activity takes place in two phases; namely, there is that which produces bodies 
and the a second one which orders them. On this basis, he considers that Plato assumes that 
the corporeal constantly exists and that it originally moves in a discordant and disorderly 
manner.20 This condition is due to the fact that, as long as the corporeal remains in itself, it 
exists in a disorganized manner. However, it is explained that it has movement, since it 
receives it by the “Nature”, which will be approached in another part of his work. But, this 
is a disorderly movement, since corporeal is responsible for not having yet received or 
utilized rational-logical features. In fact, it will never exist independently; it has not 
originally utilized what it has received but remains in an unconscious condition, which 
however performs its first actions. When the entire corporeality will utilize those 
metaphysical bounties derived from the Intellect and the intellectual Soul, it would then be 
able to participate in active and conscious terms in the transcendent powers; therefore, it 
will have orderliness.21 But, if it is just moving and receives nothing from the Intellect or 
the intellectual Soul, from which order comes directly, it will then keep necessarily its 
disorderly movement.22  
The methodology followed in this description –which is formed in successive 
logical steps–, makes clear how according to Proclus the process from the most imperfect 
 
20 These are no processes which, concerning their requirements, take place in time, although the 
position on its priority over the production of the world is still a possibility.  
21 Cf. In Platonis Timaeum commentaria, II, 383.9-10: «ὅταν γὰρ τοιοῦτον (sc. ἔννουν) γένηται τὸ 
πᾶν, τότε τῶν ὑπερφυῶν μετέχει δυνάμεων». “When the universe does become such, it [is because 
it] then participates powers which transcend [its own] nature” (p. 251). The word «ὑπερυφής» here 
means the transcendent nature that is due to the property of divinity, which is directly connected to 
the simplicity of God. This meaning is also found in the Christian thinkers. For instance, cf. Ps.-
Dionysius the Areopagite, De divinins nominibus, PG 3, 592 B, where the self-founding state of 
God is quite clear: «καὶ τὴν ὑπερυφῆ καὶ ἀσχημάτιστον ἁπλότητα τῇ ποικιλίᾳ τῶν μεριστῶν 
συμβόλων πληθυνούσης τε καὶ διαπλαττούσης». However, the important thing to keep in mind 
when approaching the above is the general and absolute difference that the Christian model is a 
monotheistic one.  
22 Cf. In Platonis Timaeum commentaria, II, 383.11-.13: «εἰ δὲ κινητὸν μὲν ὡς φύσει κινητόν, μὴ 
ὑπὸ νοῦ δὲ μηδὲ ὑπὸ ἔμφρονος ψυχῆς, ἀφ' ἧς ἡ τάξις, ἄτακτον ποιήσει τὴν κίνησιν ». “But if it is 
moved as a result of being moved by nature and not through the agency of intellect or rational soul, 
from which order [derives], it will produce disorderly movement” (251). Although Proclus makes 
just a description, his intention is quite clear. It is important to investigate whether the corporeal is a 
necessary cause for the production and what the consequences of such a version would be 
considering the true origin of and the degree in which the metaphysical powers interfere. Cf. P. 
Bastid,  Proclus et le crépuscule de la pensée grecque, p. 143. 




to the most perfect takes place, provided that it is true. That is to say, for the time being we 
should be skeptical about whether he accepts this process. He is consistent with the position 
that in every ontological process priority should be defined, considering the hypostases, 
their projections, and the methodology in which they are approached. His reference to 
applicable principles, which appear to be mandatory for any kind of transition to a new 
state, is obvious. In addition, the Neoplatonist philosopher’s critical judgements are 
stressed from the beginning, either explicitly or implicitly; it remains to clarify whether 
they are general or exemplified. Undoubtedly, he presents the necessary logical steps of the 
other philosophers being under his critique that successively form their theories. An 
indirect question could be as follows: is it possible that they are trapped in arguments and 
theories aiming at forming their own coherent system of knowledge? Is their reasoning 
confined by their interpretative goals? Considering that Syrianus’ student defends 
metaphysical realism, it comes that one of his main principles is his suggestion to overcome 
the very first thoughts so as to discover what truly exists and takes action in an ontological 
level that is beyond the sensible experience and obviously prior to it. The question is: how 
is this priority expressed or how is it explained in practice? It is to be mentioned that it is 
likely that the critique of Plutarch and Atticus does not rely on arbitrary decisions of them 
but on that they had misunderstood the true information of the Platonic passage.   
Proclus next stresses that Plato describes how the divine providence is manifested 
by means of the property which produces a body.23 According to his theory, the Demiurge 
produces all the corporeal hypostases with this property that he possesses –and obviously 
operates–, on the basis that he is the creator, the imposer of order, the artificer and the 
manufacturer.24 That is, having in mind the ad extra projection of the divine, the Demiurge 
 
23 Concerning the Platonic extract to which Proclus refers here, A. J. Festugière and H. Diehl relate 
it with 31b and 36d. However, D. T. Runia and M. Share think that it makes better sense if it is 
related to the 53b.1-3, as it also results from the next sentence (cf. Proclus. Commentary on Plato’s 
Timaeus, 251).  
24 Cf. In Platonis Timaeum commentaria, II, 383.14-17: «πλάττει γὰρ αὐτῷ πᾶν τὸ σωματικὸν ὁ 
δημιουργός, ὃ νῦν παραλαβεῖν αὐτόν φησιν, αὐτὸν ὄντα τὸν ποιητήν, αὐτὸν τὸν κοσμητήν, αὐτὸν 
τὸν τεχνίτην, αὐτὸν <τὸν> χειρουργόν». “For in his view the Demiurge [himself] moulds all the 
corporeal [element] which he here says he takes over –‘he’ being the creator, the imposer of order, 
the artificer, the manufacturer” (p. 251). According to D. T. Runia and M. Share the word «αὐτῷ» 
strikes as rather awkward. Perhaps, Proclus wrote «αὐτός» or «αὑτῷ», with both the words referring 
to the Demiurge. Or, perhaps he wrote «αὐτοῦ», in the sense of “there”, that is, a place. 
Grammatically, however, the next phrase «αὐτόν τὸν κοσμητήν….χειρουργόν» is connected with 




owns universal productive capabilities, which involve aesthetics as well. So, if he brings 
into existence the first bodies, it becomes clear that the generation of the corporeal –as a 
tool which constitutes a general original state from which the requirements for particular 
corporeal formations are derived– is part of the creation. The whole idea is based on that 
each condition that could be perceived by man has received some intervention by the 
archetypal “Forms”, which are the ontological requirements for the formation of the first 
bodies.25 So, it is highly possible that the “Forms”, after being combined, turn the property 
of producing body, which probably is the common substrate of the natural eternality, into a 
direct original producing power. It should be also mentioned that there is no clue about 
which are the first bodies. One could suppose that these are the first formations which 
constitute the basis for the productive evolution-development-expansion, in the sense of an 
improved repetition of the sensible beings, as somehow a sort of heredity.26 They could be 
also considered to be the unconceivable by man original natural cores, not however in the 
expanded sense of the body, which is explicitly presented as something sensible or 
something that is about to become sensible.27    
 
«αὐτόν» (cf. Proclus. Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus, n.238, p. 251). Our suggestion is to 
translate “within him” in the sense of the appropriate requirements –or archetypes– that are formed 
to contribute to the formation of the body.  
25 On this, cf. Timaeus, 53a.7-b.5, where we read: «ὅτε δ' ἐπεχειρεῖτο κοσμεῖσθαι τὸ πᾶν, πῦρ 
πρῶτον καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν καὶ ἀέρα, ἴχνη μὲν ἔχοντα αὑτῶν ἄττα, παντάπασί γε μὴν διακείμενα 
ὥσπερ εἰκὸς ἔχειν ἅπαν ὅταν ἀπῇ τινος θεός…». “But even when the organization of the universe 
was first taken in hand, fire, water, earth, and air, despite displaying certain hints of their true 
natures, were still wholly in the kind of state you’d expect anything to be with no god present” (R. 
Waterfield, 46). For Plato and Proclus, these are the natural elements, which come from special 
combinations of the metaphysical archetypes and of which the property of making a body is 
consisted.  
26 Following the former note, we need to mention that according to D. T. Runia and M. Share, these 
are the four elements and the bodies fashioned by their combinations (cf. Proclus. Commentary on 
Plato’s Timaeus, p. 251). It should be also noted that the Neoplatonic School till Damascius [cf. De 
principiis, II, 174-1-176.7 (Traité des premiers principes: De la triade et de l’unifié, v.II, Westerink 
Leendert Gerrit – Combès, Joshua, Paris 1989)] is closely related with the theories of the Pre-
Socratic philosophers about the elements and the relevant tradition that was formed on this basis.  
27 Cf. In Platonis Timaeum commentaria, II, 383.17-22: «Εἰ οὖν καὶ σώματα παράγει τὰ πρῶτα, 
δῆλον δή, ὅτι μέρος ἐστὶ τῆς δημιουργίας καὶ ἡ ἐκείνου γένεσις, τοῦ ὁρατοῦ δεξαμένου τινὰ τῶν 
εἰδῶν ἴχνη πρόδρομα τῆς διαρθρώσεως αὐτῶν, ἧς γενομένης ἕκαστον κεκόσμηται τελέως καὶ ἔχει 
θέσιν ἐν τῷ παντὶ καὶ τάξιν τὴν πρέπουσαν». “So, if he also brings the first bodies into existence, it 
is quite clear that the generation of [the corporeal] too is part of the creation, the visible having 
received certain traces of the [immanent] forms which were precursors of their [full] differentiation, 
with the advent of which each [of the bodies] is fully (teleôs) ordered and has its appropriate place 




So, the conclusions to this point are the following: after the structure described 
before, each of the bodies is fully ordered –in the appropriate degree– and has received a 
proper place and rank within the natural universe. In this sense, the providence is 
specialized –and, by extension, it is infinite–, for first of all it puts an end to the disorder of 
those that are with no form. And everything is without form, since originally they have not 
been gone under a formation process. Subsequently, the providence classifies the bodies in 
individual levels, which are defined by how the cosmos is generally structured and how it 
functions. However, at this point Proclus’ reasoning has gone beyond the general theory 
about providence. Now he intends to investigate the starting point of providence as well as 
under what laws did it start to manifest, so that individual levels to be formed in the 
universe, which show an infinite and developing pluralistically cosmological monism.   
Proclus then stresses that Plato explicitly stated that the divine Demiurge fabricates 
the corporeal inside the Soul (36d). He says however that during this process there was no 
substrate –namely, a receptive base– of the Soul, and that is why god did not introduce 
exclusively order into it.  It is also clear that first of all he made the being of the soul, as 
well as the “same” and the “other”, the elements of which are its constituents, which 
contribute with their synthesis to its functions. It is important here to mention that the 
categories “same” and “other” have originally an ontological meaning which is related to 
both general and (gradually) exemplified implementations. In addition, they are not 
considered as just descriptions of states or relations or comparisons.28 On this basis, the 
 
and rank in the universe” (pp. 251-252). The participle «δεξάμενου» is in past tense and strengthens 
the former remarks on universal generation of the natural by the metaphysical world, at the same 
time as the specifications of ordering and orderliness, at least as procedures, are clear. The participle 
«πρέπουσαν» is also particularly interesting, for it describes the appropriate regulative principles, 
which brings us to the skill-method of measurement. So, we could structure Proclus’ theory as 
follows: through the manifestation of the Forms a universal corporeal state is formed, which 
included the elements, which gradually manifests in the formed natural bodies. It is to be stressed 
that the expressions «ἴχνη πρόδρομα» and «ἧς γενομένης» show the somehow historical 
development of the corporeal, which is part of a cohesive process and purpose, which both give 
support to the gradually developing monism.  
28 According to Festugière the terms “ταυτόν” and “ἕτερον” are epexegetic of “ούσίαν”. According 
to Runia and Share, Proclus. Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus, n.241, p. 252, the reference is 
clearly to Timaeus 35a.1-6, where it is said that «τῆς ἀμερίστου καὶ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἐχούσης οὐσίας 
καὶ τῆς αὖ περὶ τὰ σώματα γιγνομένης μεριστῆς τρίτον ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἐν μέσῳ συνεκεράσατο οὐσίας 
εἶδος, τῆς τε ταὐτοῦ φύσεως [αὖ πέρι] καὶ τῆς τοῦ ἑτέρου, καὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ συνέστησεν ἐν μέσῳ τοῦ 
τε ἀμεροῦς αὐτῶν καὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὰ σώματα μεριστοῦ». “He combined the two kinds of substance –
the one indivisible and never changing, and the other the divided and created substance of the 




Neoplatonic philosopher draws the following conclusion which relies on monism: if this 
god produced both the elements of the soul and the synthesis that results from their 
combination, he originally produced the whole of it. This means that he did not receive a 
part of it already in existence, to which he would add another part to complete it. This is an 
approach which through its generalization can constitute a general theory about the world. 
What is more, it can be applied on every case that explicitly involves monism.  
Attempting to be more specific about how a substance is formed, Proclus says that, 
if there is reference to the Soul, which is incorporeal, the entire discussion holds true and, 
therefore, there is nothing to question. In the case of body –which comes from the 
combination of the Forms with matter– things are almost the same, as discussed in former 
parts of the work. Speaking of the Forms, he contends that God is undoubtedly their cause. 
We need to clarify here that according to the general polytheistic orientation, mostly 
derived from his treatise entitled Theologia Platonica, this god is not the Demiurge but 
another superior to him. Considering matter, the question for him is whether it is 
ungenerated by a cause, as Plutarch and Atticus claim, or generated, and if so, from what 
cause.29 Proclus’s great eclecticism-encyclopedism is here obvious. So, he recalls that 
Aristotle proved from a different theoretical path –that is, not speaking of first causes– that 
matter is ungenerated, contending that it is incomposite and that it does not come into 
existence out of other matter nor is it resolved back into other matter, after being 
separated.30  
These theories –including Aristotle’s– suggest –at least temporarily– that matter is 
ontologically everlasting, a property which puts it in a prior level to that of the forms that is 
 
physical world– into an intermediate, third kind of substance, and then again, in the case of both 
identity and difference, he likewise formed intermediates between, in each case, that aspect of them 
which is undivided and that aspect of them which is divided in the physical realm” (Waterfield, p. 
23). At this point, the Demiurge produces identity and otherness as middle beings, as the first stage 
for the production of the Soul, which can be considered as the synthesis of two opposites and, 
possibly, as the possibility for any cosmic condition that will participate in these two categories.   
29 Cf. In Platonis Timaeum commentaria, II, 383.31-384.6. Cf. Atticus, fragm. 24.  
30 According to Festugière, these are the chapters 6-9 of Aristotle’s Physics, where the 
“ὑποκείμενον” is referred to as “ὕλη” (cf. 192a.31). That matter is incomposite results from that it is 
determined by a “ἄρχή”. That it does not come into existence out of other matter, cf. 189a.27-32, 
and that it is not resolved back into other matter, cf. 192a.28-34. For a general approach, cf. 
Aristotle, De Caelo, I, 3, 270.24-27. 




about to receive or is about to reveal. Proclus also investigates whether it is ungenerated by 
a cause and whether, by extension, according to Plato one should posit in the cosmological 
procedures two principles of the universe31, matter32 and God. In addition, if we accept this 
co-operation, one factor excludes the other, that is to say, God does not produce matter and 
matter does not produce God. The final purpose is to show, by using confuting or negative 
adjectives, that matter is completely everlasting and without God33, while God is totally 
without matter and simple.34 So, how completely opposites could actually combine to each 
 
31 This is a reference to the two-principle doctrine of the early Platonism, at least till Antiochus of 
Ascalon.  
32 According to Runia and Share, Proclus here fails to distinguish between the “receptacle” of the 
Timaeus and the matter of Aristotle (cf. Proclus. Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus, n.247, p. 253). 
Cf. In Platonis Timaeum Commentaria, III, 10.8-10, where he says: «διὸ καὶ τοῦ παντὸς ὑποδοχὴν 
αὐτὴν (sc. τὴν ὕλην) ἐρεῖ [49 A 51 A] προελθών». “For this reason Plato goes on to call matter 
receptacle of the universe in what follows” (Baltzly, Dirk. Proclus: Commentary on Plato’s 
Timaeus: Proclus on the World Body, v.3, b.3 Cambridge 2007, p. 50). Baltzly in his comments 
says that Proclus identifies matter with the “μεταληπτικόν” of Aristotle (cf. Physica, 4.1, 209b.11-
12). And while modern scholars have questioned this identification (cf. for instance, Cherniss, 
Harold Fredrik. Aristotle’s Criticism of Plato and the Academy, Baltimore 1944, pp. 121-122, who 
also stresses that it is possible Aristotle to have misunderstood the Platonic unwritten doctrine, for 
he identified “the great and the small” with the Platonic notions “χώρα” and “τόπος”). Ancient 
Platonists seem to have been less hesitant to accept it. It should be mentioned that it is probably an 
identification that goes back to Antiochus of Ascalon. It is very likely –and we should mention it– 
that this assimilation of the receptacle to matter results from the tendency of middle Platonists to 
read the Timaeus through Stoicism. And one way to approach the two principles of the physics of 
the Stoics (that is, god and matter) lies on Timaeus. The Stoic god as a principle corresponds to 
Plato’s three distinct principles: the paradigm, the Demiurge and the World Soul (cf. Moreau, 
Joseph. L’âme du monde de Platon aux Stoïciens, Hildescheim 1965, pp. 160 ff.). Note also that 
Proclus’ matter includes what Aristotle’s matter does, although there are clear differences between 
monism and dualism. One could read Kojève, Alexandre. Essai d’une histoire raisonnée de la 
philosophie païenne, vol.III (Paris 1973), who analyses how Proclus synthesizes, in an eclecticist 
manner, Platonism, Aristotelianism, and Stoicism. Through this combination, he actually succeeds 
in showing how Proclus makes a distinction of metaphysics of transcendence from metaphysics of 
immanence, presenting the latter as resulting from the initiative of the former.   
33 On this topic, cf. extract 368.5: «ἡ μὲν γὰρ ὕλη διὰ τὸ ἀνείδεον καὶ ἄμορφον ἄθεος ἤδη τισὶν 
ἔδοξεν εἶναι». “For while matter, on account of its formlessness and shapelessness, has seemed to 
some to be ipso facto divorced from god (atheos)” (Runia and Share, p. 230). 
34 Cf. In Platonis Timaeum commentaria, 2, 383.23-384.12. According to Runia and Share, 
Festugière’s comment “ἁπλοῦς étonne” seems even in the most moderate sense unnecessary. 
Probably, it is present just to balance ἀΐδιος, which, taking into account Proclus statement on that 
matter is ἀΐδιος, is itself a reference with no meaning (cf. Proclus. Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus, 
n. 249, p. 253). It is to be mentioned that the fact that Proclus has related ἀΐδιον with both the 
natural world and time, describing the constant and consistent evolution for the actualization of 
teleology, since the beginning of the second book of this treatise, should not escape attention. After 
having mentioned the difference between ἀΐδιον and αἰώνιον he explains that two are the kinds of 




other? It is to be said that eternality is a challenge not only considering duration but mostly 
regarding the possibility of the ontological and categorical transformations.  
Commenting on this, one could say that the question on creation follows a different 
direction from the original one. Ontological and by extension cosmological dualism appears 
as a strong possibility in this chapter. In fact, there is a question about which substance, the 
soul’s or the body’s, is actually related to –or at least is related mostly to– the ontological 
predicates of the “same” and “other”. The answer will define what predicates can be added 
to these two factors, which appear as parts of the creation of the sensible world, in the sense 
that they necessarily co-operate. According to the style and general context of Proclus’ 
commentary, we could say that the idea of this kind of co-operation for the production 
process has to do only with the theoretical needs of this or any other related to this subject 
matter. According to the concepts used and their grammatical approach, it does not negate 
dualism; it just includes it, in almost an explicitly manner, among issues related with 
evaluation or priorities. For the time being, the question is what substance is superior with 
respect to quality. The entire discussion, however, leads to new perspectives and the goals 
will follow a different direction, at least after the original Neoplatonic solutions will be 
exposed, which methodologically are flexible. In the Platonic Academy, the 
epistemological efforts have already formed their integral perspectives and are constantly 
renewed and expanded. Proclus is completely aware of this dynamic spirit and follows it 
consistently.    
 
3. Limit and unlimited as productive powers 
 
Analyzing the subject matter mentioned before, Proclus contends that the fact that 
according to Plato the Demiurge does not originally bring matter into existence results from 
the Timaeus 52d. He also stresses that the factors that pre-exist as necessary requirements 
 
ἀϊδιότης. One of them is associated to the metaphysical world, while the second one is related to the 
natural world. In our view, Proclus definitely considers matter as ἀΐδιος throughout the entire 
treatise on the basis of teleology, which will be completed when the natural developments will be 
completed. Note also that the natural world never receives the property of aeon, despite the fact that 
time, which provides the substrate for cosmic developments and completeness, is considered to be 
the sensible and movable image of aeon. Change of substance, that is, a total differentiation of the 
ontological filed, is out of the question. 




for the production of the natural world are three, “being”, “place” and “generation”.35 
Taking into account how they combine, he points out that generation is the effect, place is 
the mother, the source from which an effect comes and a procedure derives the terms and 
conditions to be accomplished. In this sense, Plato gives the impression that he separates or 
excludes a direct communication between matter and the Demiurge regarding the nature of 
their productive intervention for everything that will come into existence of will be formed. 
On the other hand, he seems that he contends that generation results from both these 
ontological factors, the Demiurge and matter. In conclusion, it seems, at least for the time 
being, that there is no prior reality to the Demiurge, from which generation would result. 
However, the inconsistency is obvious, for generation is part of two levels. To overcome 
this, Syrianus’ student contends that in his dialogue Philebus (23c) the founder of the 
Academy placed in the world of the authentic beings “limit” and “unlimited”, from the 
combination of which arose the constitution of the entire natural world and the particular 
bodies, as both a general production and exemplified formation-function. His syllogism at 
this point is as follows: if bodies were made of limit and unlimitedness, the –nominalist– 
question raised would be what limit and unlimitedness are, which are found in a particular 
form in a body, including their special co-operation? Taking into account that they inhere 
universally – and in endless ways–, the answer –following Plato– is generally that matter is 
the unlimitedness while Form is the limit. By extension, if God produces every 
unlimitedness, it arises that he also produces matter, the first negative or, to be more 
accurate, the most inferior unlimitedness, for he intervenes universally. By rejecting in this 
way any possibility of dualism, the Neoplatonic philosopher claims that unlimitedness –
and, indirectly, the Demiurge, namely, god– is the very first and ineffable cause of matter, 
which shows that in this theory he adds ontologically and axiologically extra value to it.36 
Therefore, attempting to show that the Philebus completes and explains the Timaeus, he 
draws the conclusion that matter does not pre-exist. And although he removes from matter 
 
35 This view is rendered to Plutarch and Atticus and is also found in Timaeus 52d.3-5.  
36 Cf. In Platonis Timaeum commentaria, II, 384.13-385.3. Cf. Trouillard, Jean. «Procession 
Néoplatonicienne et création judeochrétienne», Néoplatonisme (Paris 1981), pp. 1-30. These 
approaches of Proclus could be associated with what he says about the “enmattered Forms” in other 
parts of his work.  




the self-constitute property, he attributes to it superior ontological characteristics, since he 
considers it coming from a transcendent principle.37  
At this point, Proclus uses the principle of analogy, both by combining 
transcendence with immanence and by setting clear limits between them. So, he says that in 
each level of the cosmos the –productive and structural– elements that exist in sensible 
things are analogous to their intelligible causes. Having in mind these causes, Plato 
describes the production of the world. For instance, god produces the cosmic equal from the 
Equal-itself, the same from the Sameness-itself and all living creatures and plants here 
below in an appropriate archetypical way in each case. The important thing here is that he 
does not only describe properties, but formed beings, although he does not give any further 
explanation. It is necessary first of all the universal ontological powers that ensure the 
general principles of being and its function to take action and, subsequently, those 
particular powers that determine exemplified forms of being and function to be activated, 
namely, those of the particular beings. What is here meant is that probably in the 
metaphysical world there are both individual archetypes in the form of reasons (ontological 
planning cores) and combinations for the formation of the elements, as they are expected to 
appear in many forms within the sensible things as both their components and the sources 
of their functions. Generalizing, the philosopher contends that the Demiurge similarly 
produces cosmic unlimitedeness from the very first Unlimitedeness and cosmic limit from 
the very first Limit.38 So, the world of becoming –and obviously the entire visible level– is 
a reflection of being, probably in the sense of a structural parallelism, not though in an 
absolute sense. This reflection is related, at least according to the above reasoning, with the 
production of what exists here below by what exists there above.   
 
37 For a historical and systematic approach of how Proclus utilizes the Platonic works in relation to 
the topic under discussion here, cf. Theologia Platonica, III, 28-23-52.11. In this long text, which is 
subdivided in eight chapters, Proclus analyzes how he approaches monism through the Platonic 
dialogue Philebus. He also associates Philebus with the dialogues Parmenides, Sophista, and 
Timaeus.  
38 Cf. In Platonis Timaeum commentaria, II, 385.3-9. Considering the concepts “limit-unlimited” in 
Proclus’ work cf. for instance Theologia Platonica, III, 30.15-34.19. In the text elaborated here, 
Proclus, by utilizing a kind of circularity, which is also defined by the “reversion” to the sources, 
claims that the immanent presence of these ontological realities depends upon the transcendent 
Form.  




Proclus then mentions that in other parts of his work he has also proved that the first 
Unlimitedeness, which is prior to the mixed, was produced by the very first Cause –the 
One-Good– found at the summit of the intelligible gods, who, according to the 
Ontotheology that he structures, correspond to the category of “Being”. So, the first 
Unlimitedness extends its productive illuminations from the higher reaches of being of the 
metaphysical world to the lowest visible beings. In his view, according to Plato, matter 
proceeds both from the One and Unlimitedeness, which is obviously received as power or 
energy of the productive “procession”. And this is actually a kind of Unlimitedness which 
is prior to the “One-Being”, which determines the universal structures of the productive 
plans, in the sense that it is the supreme ontological category. More specifically, it could be 
said that matter also proceeds from the One-Being, for it is a potential being, the purpose of 
which is to complete its unity. It arises that matter is somehow good and without limit, in 
the sense that it is a being without complete ontological idioms and without form, although 
in a monistic system this approach does not fit with the general principles. On the other 
hand, taking into account the ontological, demiurgic, and productive priorities, Proclus 
explains that the One, the first Unlimitedeness and the One-Being are prior to the 
archetypal Forms and, by extension, to their exemplified interventions. It should be 
mentioned that this priority-hierarchy reflects a sort of ontological necessity, so as the 
requirements for the completeness of the production to be ensured. So, once again it is 
necessary the universal ontological powers which ensure the general principles of both 
being and the laws of their function to take action and, then, those which contribute to the 
manifestation of the exemplified ones.39  
Syrianus’ student mentions that Orpheus teaches exactly the same doctrine, utilizing 
his own ontological and cosmological model. So, as Plato derived two causes from the One, 
 
39 Cf. In Platonis Timaeum commentaria, II, 385.9-17: «…άγαθόν πῆ ἔστι καὶ ἄπειρον, καὶ 
ἀμυδρότατον ὂν καὶ ἀνείδεον (sc. τὴν ὕλην). “… it is a good of a kind, a thing without limit, and the 
most indistinct [grade of] being’ (pp. 254-255). On the new tendency of Proclus compared to that of 
Plotinus, Trouillard says: “Proclos fait un pas de plus que Plotin. Comme lui, mais plus clairement, 
il affirme que la matière procède de l’Un. Comme lui, il la fait dériver par la mediation d’une infinit 
génératrice de l’intelligible, que les Ennéades appellant “matière intelligible”, alors que Proclos 
n’emploie pas ce mot dans ce sens. Mais le Lycien tire la dernière conséquence de cette these. La 
matière ne peut être le mal pur ni l’origine de tout mal. Elle a une certaine bonté, celle qui évoque 
l’Un par son indetermination inépuisable. Ainsi est éliminé du néoplatonisme le dernier préjugé 
défavorable envers le corps” (L’Un et l’âme selon Proclos, Paris 1972, p. 71). By excluding evil 
from matter, Proclus suggests an optimist cosmological example.  




that is, Limit and Unlimitedness, this theologian also brought Aether and Chaos into 
existence from Time. He considered Aether as the cause –or the ontological counterpart– of 
limit no matter where it is found, and Chaos as the cause –or the ontological counterpart– 
of unlimitedness.40 Therefore, it could be said that the ontological factor which arises is the 
state of co-production or multiple causes, in the sense that production starts from the 
superior metaphysical levels and comes through the inferiors, so that matter to come into 
existence and to receive specific forms. Through this polyvalent way of interference, 
ontological monism, which is not simplistic, is reinstated. It should be also mentioned, that 
Proclus, by stressing the pluralistic nature of causality, remains consistent with the basic 
principles of his system, where the middle factors hold the most important role, in the form 
of necessity. They are interferences which preserve the unparticipated (“remaining”) while 
at the same time cause the procedures for participation (“procession”), which constitute the 
source of the principle of analogy that leads to more than one meaning. 
 
4. Production as co-production  
 
Attempting to be more specific on the question about the middles, the Neoplatonic 
philosopher –by utilizing ontological predicates with which he is familiar– stresses that 
matter proceeds from the principles mentioned before and their hierarchy. He also mentions 
that the intelligible and intellectual causes of the second and third metaphysical level as 
well as both the supercelestial and the encosmic ones, which for his Ontotheology 
correspond to the inferior gods which hold intentional qualities, successively participate in 
the process of production. Moreover, he contends that “Nature” also produces matter, for it 
 
40 Cf. In Platonis Timaeum commentaria, II, 385.17-22. Cf. Orpheus, fr.52. Also, Trouillard, Jean. 
“Les degrés du ποιεῖν chez Proclos”, Dionysius 1 (1977), p. 72; Moutsopoulos, Evanghelos. “La 
structure de l’espace chez Proclus”, Revue Philosophique 107 (1982), pp. 419-433, especially p. 
430. According to Festugière this passage is associated with the 176.6-15 of the same treatise and 
the 138.8 ff. of his commentary on Respublica. It is to be mentioned that Proclus also elaborates 
Orpheus’ positions and stresses that this poet considers that everything permanent and found in an 
identity state comes from this supreme Principle, while everything that is subject to distinctions, 
such as Nature and the inferior unlimitedeness, constitute the ontological factors that define matter. 
After synthesizing Orpheus’ positions, he stresses –following the new terminology formed by the 
Neo-Platonists– that matter comes from the first hypostasis of the Intelligibles. Finally, he contends 
that in Hermes Trismegistus’ texts materiality appears as produced by being and possibly Plato was 
influenced by this position.  




is present at the point in which this new ontological factor comes into “being”. This is an 
important remark for it provides a good support to his explanation, since “Nature is a 
crucial factor for the transition from the metaphysical to the natural world and works as a 
direct cause. Concluding Proclus’ views about the ontological meaning of “Nature”, it 
could be said that it is prior over the entire sensible world and determines the way in which 
it works. By extension, it will produce matter as well, as long as it is a part of the procedure 
during which this cosmic factor which is about to become sensible comes gradually into the 
formed existence. So, it should be contended that Nature is a universal ontological reality, 
which includes in seeds or in reasons what is to become sensible, that is, matter and its 
exemplified forms. Within it all the metaphysical original procedures of production are 
completed and the energy of metaphysical archetypes turns into natural reasons, which are 
the sources of a specialized development or growth in any field of the sensible world, 
although it is not known how this transformation takes place. For instance, the natural 
reason of a human being, a tree and an animal exist within the Nature.41 So, in these terms, 
Nature forms the requirements that are necessary so that in another level matter to 
participate in the very first cause (obviously by means of “procession” and “reversion”, 
which follow successive interferences).42  
 
41 About the concept and the function of Nature in Proclus’ system, cf. for instance In Platonis 
Parmenidem, 793b-796.13. Cf. Rosán, Laurence Jay. The philosophy of Proclus. The Final phase of 
Ancient Thought (New York 1949), pp. 115-117.  
42 Cf. In Platonis Timaeum Commentaria, II, 386.16-18: «καὶ τί λέγω περὶ τῶν θεῶν αὐτῶν; ἀλλὰ 
καὶ ἡ τοῦ παντὸς φύσις παράγει τὴν ὕλην καθόσον ἐστὶ καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτῆς ὕπαρξιν». “But why 
am I talking of the gods alone (autoi)? Universal nature (hê tou pantos phusis) also produces matter 
–with the proviso that it exists in accordance with its own mode of existence as well; for with regard 
to this last it participates the very first cause” (Runia –Share, p. 256). There are many explanations 
of this extract. Runia and Share, Proclus. Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus, n. 280, pp. 256-257, 
contend the following: “Thomas Taylor assumed a lacuna before ἐστί in line 17 and supplied θεός, 
which would make good sense in itself but is, I think, ruled out by καὶ τί λέγω περὶ τῶν θεῶν; A. J. 
Fèstugiere, who followed Taylor in assuming a lacuna before ἐστί, supplied αἴτιον (though, as he 
says, only exempli gratia), and translated, ‘c’est aussi la Nature universelle qui fait venir à l’être la 
Matière, pour autant qu’elle est une <cause> et selon son propre mode d’être: car c’est en vertu de 
la nature que la Matière participle à La Cause toute première’. This makes tolerable sense (although 
there are still difficulties), but only by having ταύτην refer back to ἡ τοῦ παντός φύσις and making 
ὕλη the subject of μετέχει when the obvious referent of ταύτην would be τὴν ἑαυτῆς ὕπαρξιν and 
the obvious subject for μετέχει would be ἡ τοῦ παντός φύσις. H have retained Diehl’s text (which is 
that of C and M), but (1) regarded ἀλλἀ καὶ…ὕλην (16-17) as parenthetic, and (2) accented ἔστι in 
line 17. The words καθόσον ἔστι καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτῆς ὕπαρξιν· κατὰ γὰρ ταύτην μετέχει τῆς 
πρωτίστης αἰτίας will then serve to define the terms on which the range of causes between the 
Intelligibles and Nature can be said to produce matter. (Cf. the words καθόσον ἐστι δυνάμει ὄν at 




Subsequently, Proclus says that the Demiurge, with respect to the henad within him, 
in virtue of which he is also a god, is responsible for even the lowest grade of matter. 
However, he is not the cause of matter in the sense in which the Being is, which produces it 
primarily or provides it with the capability to exist, which is a necessary requirement for the 
various forms. Literally, he is responsible for the bodies, as long as they are bodies, and the 
corporeal qualities. This is a general expression of causality that indicates that generation is 
originally also the offspring of the Being, for generation cannot exist without being. It is 
clear that being comes before generation, which is associated with particular forms or 
bodies. Attempting to be more specific, he says, with respect to the life within him, that the 
Demiurge produces the animation which pervades with its own property all things and, 
with respect to the Intellect within him, that he produces –or, more accurately, provides– 
the quality of the intellect to the universe, which is assigned with exactly the same task. 
Every production, according to the context, is considered as an exemplification of the 
supreme realities in the form of powers or inherent properties. And with respect to the 
principles of the middles, everything that the Demiurge creates by virtue of his inferior 
powers, he produces it with his superior powers as well; so, multi-causality and co-
causality are dominant. For Proclus, this is due to the fact that everything with intellect also 
participates to “life”, “being”, and “unity”. A “living thing” has being and is one; and a 
thing that has “being” is exclusively sustained by the supreme unity, which is the most 
appropriate for it in relation to other categories. Since this is a hierarchical system, the 
opposite is excluded. In short: the One, in its productive presence –that is, when it is 
considered as a second One– pervades with its superior powers his providence in more 
areas of the world than any other productive cause and that is why it is a universal cause. 
So, the second One exists in every metaphysical and natural being as the very first cause, 
 
385.14, which similarly explain how τὸ ἕν ὄν can be said to produce matter.) I don’t see this as a 
wholly satisfactory solution, but I think it is probably on the right track”. Either way, the emanation 
process of the metaphysical world and the production of the natural level come from the 
manifestation of the “one-being”, which, according to the Neoplatonic theory, reveals itself in 
successive phases through the ontological categories of the second hypothesis of the Platonic 
dialogue Parmenides, which indicate ways to exist.  




regardless of what is their nature or what is their position in hierarchy.43 Unity is the 
absolute regulative source that is exemplified through the rest ontological categories. 
Accordingly, Proclus, by using predicates that describe the quality, depends 
ontologically the natural world –which is defined also as ordering– on the goodness of the 
Demiurge, the divinity that is responsible for the production process, which is performed in 
virtue of its superior, compared to all the others, idiom. Repeating what Plato has said, he 
points out that the sensible world as a whole is not left bereft of the divine providence, in 
the sense of both a particular space and development. He also says that this realm is the 
corporeal universe, since the incorporeal and with no qualities would be invisible and, thus, 
it would not express an intervening providence in that which has no body or quality. By 
extension, the corporeal is not identical to matter without qualities or the second substrate44, 
that is, the Platonic “place”; instead, it is the reality that participates in the Forms, and 
contains certain traces and reflections of them, despite the fact that it originally moves in a 
discordant and disorderly manner. The ghostly –not authentic– and disjointed presences of 
the Forms create various movements in this visible mass, which however are not in the first 
 
43 Cf. In Platonis Timaeum Commentaria, II, 386.13-29. The distinction between the gift of being 
and generation is interesting. Basically, generation does not include this gift, but requires it. Cf. J. 
Trouillard, J. Trouillard, La mystagogie de Proclos, Paris 1982, 89-90, who also says the following: 
«Platon ne dit mot dans le Timée d’une procession de la substance indivisible ni de la divisée. 
Pourtant Proclos, dans deus pages intrépides de son Commentaire sur le Timée (I, 385 et 386), 
affirme que Platon enseigne l’une et l’autre procession, et même que le Démiurge, en tant qu’il est 
dieu, est cause de la matière elle-même» (p. 129). On these, cf. Philebus, 30d. In addition, 
according to Festugière, the above are explained in props. 56 and 57 of Institutio Theologica: “All 
that is produced by secondary beings is in a greater measure produced from those prior and more 
determinative principles from which the secondary were themselves derived” (Dodds, Eric 
Robertson. Proclus: The Elements of Theology, Oxford 1933, p. 55); “Every case both operates 
prior to its consequent and gives rise to a greater number of posterior terms” (Dodds, 55). 
44 This is Proclus’ only reference to the “δεύτερον ὑποκείμενον”. About the “πρῶτον ὑποκείμενον”, 
cf. his comments on Parmenides, 971.9, where, once again, he does not define it in precision. About 
the latter term, cf. Physica, 1.9, 192a.31 and Metaphysica Ζ3, 1029a.2, where Aristotle identifies it 
with matter. According to Runia and Share, Proclus. Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus, n. 287, p. 
258, in the commentary tradition from Ammonius onwards (which should be a reasonable guide to 
Proclus’ use of the terms), the “πρῶτον ὑποκείμενον” is the prime matter while the “δεύτερον 
ὑποκείμενον” is body with bulk and extension but without qualities (ἄποιον σῶμα). Note that here 
Proclus identifies “ὕλη” with the “δεύτερον ὑποκείμενον”. The passage which best illustrates the 
usage of the commentators is probably Philoponus’ comments on Aristotle’s Categories, 65.8-27, 
where the Alexandrian thinker uses the term “πρώτη ὕλη” to refer to the “πρῶτον ὑποκείμενον”. 
For the term “δεύτερον ὑποκείμενον”, cf. also Ammonius’ comments on Categories, 54.4-6, as well 
as Philoponus’ comments on Categories, 83.14-18, and on Metaphysica, 156.12-17, 225.11-16, 
579.3-6. Cf, Simplicius’ comments on De caelo, 564.29-565.6, 576.6-10. 




place in order, at least not completely.45 It is to be mentioned that this temporal disorder is 
not due to an imperfect interference of the Forms 
In this productive context –and in order its formation to be appropriately corrected– 
all of the orders of gods which are prior to the Demiurge feed the interventions of the 
Forms and by means of them the entire regulatory movements, both ontologically and with 
respect to the quality of the procedures undertaken. The Paradigm irradiates them the most, 
just be its own being. The entire process is believed that it takes place before the creation, 
that is, before the productive procedures to become sensible. It should be mentioned 
however that this “before” needs further investigation, for the possibility the presence of 
“being” to be complete during the production by other ontological factors as well is very 
strong. Obviously, these would be factors that exemplify it, for the sensible world is not 
known for the idiom of being but for the endless variety of its forms, which include 
functions and define constantly relationships. Utilizing his common schemas, the 
Neoplatonic philosopher stresses that the higher causes are active before the inferiors. For 
instance, he mentions that the Demiurge creates conjointly with the Paradigm, while the 
Paradigm makes similar actions before the Demiurge to take action and penetrates in those 
beings which the activity of the demiurgic providence does not reach. What is indirectly 
here stated is that if there is no Paradigm –whose ontotheological content is not defined 
here, although it could be considered as the synthesis of the productive projections of the 
divine beings–, the productive-creative function of the Demiurge is not possible. The 
conclusion is in accordance with Proclus’ general principles on co-causality and hierarchy 
of the causes. This is actually a typical application of the somehow multi-principle 
production system.46  
Proclus then summarizes what he has said about the pluralism of the divine causes. 
So, he contends that if we wish to distinguish the different metaphysical causes as well as 
 
45 Cf. also Timaeus, 52a.4-53b.4. Cf. In Platonis Timaeum commentaria, II, 387.6-23. 
46 Cf. In Platonis Timaeum commentaria, II, 387.23-28. Moutsopoloulos, Evanghelos describing the 
theory of the cause hierarchy, mentions the following: «L’ideé de hiérarchie des causes, des 
modèles et des fondements des formes sensibles, privées d’énergie et de mouvement, est empruntée 
à Platon (Πολιτεία, 597e). La notion d’immobolité des images se trouve en contradiction apparente 
avec celle de mouvement des structures inférieurs, lié non seulement à leur altérabilité et à leur 
mutabilité, mais aussi aux mouvements qu’elles provoquent dans l’âme» (Les structures de 
l’imaginaire dans la philosophie de Proclus, Paris 1985, pp. 50-51). Moutsopoulos refers mostly to 
the extract II, 324.24-34 of the same commentary.  




the effect of their productive projection, we will draw the following conclusion about the 
“Good”: a) It is the cause of all things, and it is the cause of matter. This is a kind of 
causality –actually the greatest one– that turns matter into a necessary thing, in order the 
production of the sensible world to take place. b) It is the cause of projection –and 
apparently– the way in which Forms intervene, which is also a measure of what is provided 
for the production. It could be said here that measure is considered to be a kind of 
necessity, in the sense that individual beings are strictly defined to each other, so that their 
exemplified presences to be clearly distinguished from one another. c) It is the cause of 
order, which ensures the logical coherence of those which are produced, so that the entire 
ontological system to be functionally articulated. So, the Good is the universal cause, which 
provides in the first place being and functionality to all things. And this universality of it 
establishes the undeniable ontological and productive monism that Proclus adopts.47 It 
should be mentioned however that this monism is not static or simplistic, for it is 
exemplified with the manifold of the individual causes, which derive from the very First 
Cause and reveal its infinite richness, regarding the quality and quantity.    
He then stressed that the Paradigm is not the causal source of matter, but it functions 
in a more exemplified manner: it provides the capability of the form and order found in 
Forms, which are to become the structural factor for the formation of matter. Furthermore, 
the productive property is the strictly exemplified –but not exclusive– cause of order. That 
is why it intervened in matter, while it was to participate in Forms and receive a form. It is 
to be mentioned however that the capability of matter to receive order is a gift given by the 
Good. But, it is a capability without the necessary exemplifications and the analogous 
activations. When it is about to acquire these exemplifications, it accepts the assistance of 
the demiurgic cause, which has undertaken this responsibility. Proclus actually thinks that 
the result of the demiurgic intervention is that the disordered, having been configured to 
some degree, is to some extent superior to something without shape and form. That is, 
disorder does not exclude a being from being part of a broader cosmological system, even 
in the sense that it will receive a form in future.48  
 
47 Cf. In Platonis Timaeum commentaria, II, 387.23-28. Cf. Theologia Platonica, ΙΙ, 3.5-14.6 
48 Cf. In Platonis Timaeum commentaria, II, 387.28-388.1. Cf. Theologia Platonica, III, 53.1-15.  




The conclusions that the Neoplatonist philosopher draws are the following: a) all the 
metaphysical realities mentioned before are causes as well. b) Their products are put in a 
hierarchy according to the extent to which every produced being possess the divine gifts 
which necessarily every one of them holds. c) A Paradigm receives matter from the Good 
and forms it, since it is the ontological reality that systematically activates Forms. d) The 
Demiurge takes over the Forms from the Paradigm and defines his identity and functions 
by the Good, after the necessary middle procedures have taken place, so that to manifest in 
a demiurgic manner after the Forms have been established to the new reality that is formed. 
Therefore, a) Forms, as long as they are Forms, are exemplifications of the projections of 
the Paradigm. On its part, b) the demiurgic idiom, after having received Forms from the 
Paradigm, regulates by means of numbers and imposes order by means of proportions, that 
is, the coherent-functional ontological cores. By extension, Proclus explains: if one 
distinguishes the causes in this fashion and considers that the Demiurge alone is the direct 
cause of all natural things, he will draw the conclusion that he creates in special ways. That 
is to say, he creates in one way in relation to his goodness, in another in relation to the 
Paradigm in him and in another in relation to his own character of creator and artisan. And 
although the Demiurge creates all things at once and eternally, different things proceed 
from the different causes that lie originally and eternally within him. More specifically, 
under the terms of the immanent presences within the Demiurge, the following take place: 
owing to the Good, matter, form and order come into existence, owing to the Paradigm just 
form and owing to his character of artisan, order, where hierarchy dominates. So, this 
reality, which has received form from the Paradigm, which is intelligible in its ontological 
sources, has received the reflections of the Forms before order, which is provided by the 
Demiurge. From this order derives not pure matter but ‘polymorphous matter’.49 It is clear 
that the Neoplatonic philosopher does not mean matter without qualities, but matter along 
with qualities, which come from all of its causes. Every cause has made a part of it, that is, 
that which ontologically is for it the demiurgic one, comprehensible up to a point by human 
mind. Moreover, the exclusion of matter without qualities makes impossible any pre-
 
49 Cf. In Platonis Timaeum commentaria, II, 388.2-20. Cf. In Platonis Parmenidem¸701.12-14. The 
sixth book of Theologia Platonica is important for a broader understanding of these, since there 
Proclus elaborates what he believes that it takes place in the last level of the metaphysical world.  




existence and, by extension, any suspicion of ontological dualism. Any reference related to 
it is just theoretical. From the context however, results that the inherent qualities in matter 
appear gradually, so order increases in an analogous manner. What follows will provide a 
better explanation.   
 
5. To a further exclusion of matter without qualities  
 
According to Proclus, matter is not the first ontological reality which presents a 
broad variety. By extension, generation does not take place, in its literal sense, just in order 
matter to receive a particular hypostasis. This is a crucial remark, for it excludes the 
possibility of simplistic monism. He stresses that the property of polymorphism belongs 
originally and basically to the ontological factor which contains precursory traces of the 
Forms.50 This could be either the “Nature” in general or any formed body, which, as 
products of superior emanations, are composite. Regardless of what this reality is, 
according to the general principles being applied, it necessarily has been fed by a supreme 
variety. By this transfer of variety to the metaphysical level, it is proved that the Paradigm 
is something different from the Demiurge; so, despite the fact that the final goal is the 
same, their tasks are different. The requirement for these to take place is the following: 
matter has to participate in the Paradigm before the process of its ordering, when, in a 
sense, there was no Demiurge in this participation. On the other hand, matter appears 
participating to the Demiurge, from whom it takes over order and form, which both show 
that this divine cause from a point onwards clearly co-operates with the Paradigm.51  
So, according to the Lycian philosopher, the verb “takes over” of the Platonic text 
would also describe, at least to a point, the transcendent paradigmatic cause of the 
demiurgic providence. The material substrate, which is already diversified, takes also over 
certain traces of Forms. It could be also said that Proclus describes a variety of actions that 
correspond to a variety of powers which co-operate to achieve the final ordering, provided 
that all of the powers involved lie, under the necessary transformations, within the 
 
50 Cf. Timaeus, 52b.2. 
51 Cf. In Platonis Timaeum commentaria, II, 388.2-28: «Ού γὰρ ἐστιν ἡ πρώτη πολυποίκιλος (sc. ἡ 
ὕλη) οὐδὲ γένεσις αὐτῆς ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἔχοντος ἴχνη πρόδρομα τῶν εἰδῶν». 




Demiurge. In this case, the Demiurge would be the same being who took things over and 
passed them on, in special in each case conditions and powers. That is to say, he takes over 
demiurgic properties and passes on the substantial existence and the ordering to things. 
Note that this dual state eventually results to self-production, which in Proclus’ system is an 
idiom possessed exclusively by self-constituted beings, namely, the metaphysical ones. 
And a metaphysical being possess this property in the sense that by taking part in its own 
production, it actually proves its authentic ontological identity and the appropriate for it 
hypostatic unity. Furthermore, its self-reference is also completed by the fact that it sets the 
foundations for the emanation of an inferior being, which somehow shows the development 
of otherness or at least dissimilarity.52 
Proclus then contends that Plato’s expression “not in a state or rest but moving” 
indicates that the Demiurge assigned first and foremost to “Nature” the task to provide 
matter with movement. This can primarily lead to that if “Nature” was irrational and 
without guidance from the interference of a divine being, it would be doubtful whether it 
could hold and provide a particular order. As he mentions, this view is presented by Plato 
in Politicus.53 In this treatise, after the Athenian philosopher has distinguished the 
Demiurge from the natural world, he says that this world moves by itself by a kind of 
destiny and connatural desire. So, whatever mentioned there that actually exists in the 
natural world after the creation, Plato postulates in Timaeus that also exists before creation. 
Furthermore, he argued that in the movement of the visible a disorder arises without the 
involvement of the intellect.54 One could here confirm a moderate determinism, which 
includes two details: a) the divine volition needs to manifest, so that the necessary functions 
for the formation process to take place, and b) within the metaphysical world necessarily all 
the elements pre-exist which are found in the natural beings which appear successively in 
certain qualities; this is how the connection between the two worlds is proved in the 
monistic sense. This communication would be obviously not feasible if the natural world 
 
52 Βλ. In Platonis Timaeum commentaria, ΙΙ, 388.29-389.5. About the concept of self-constituted in 
Proclus’ metaphysical system, cf. Institutio theologica, props.40-51, 42.8-50.6, with Dodds’ 
comments composing a thorough approach.    
53 Cf. 272e.5-6, where there is the word “σύμφυτος”, which appears to have a direct relevance to the 
concept of “φύσις”.   
54 Cf. In Platonis Timaeum commentaria, II, 389.6-15.  




would remain a kind of pre-existing matter without qualities and would hold only the 
property of being without that of generation.   
Explaining further the Platonic texts, Proclus contends that the expression “bringing 
of it from order to disorder” means that the whole process here is taking place through the 
participation of matter in both the Intellect and intellective life. Moreover, the verbal type 
“having judged” shows the thought of the Demiurge, which is in conformity with his will 
and power. Or, else, the conditions of the divine “providence” participate as a whole in the 
production process. Generalizing the discussion, it is stressed that goodness is the first 
factor in the process of causality, power is the second one, and Intellect is the third one. 
This hierarchy does not imply that they do not communicate to each other or that they do 
not complete each other.55 It is actually declared that the Demiurge took care of the obvious 
disorder according to the order found within him. Proclus here quotes Aristotle, stressing 
that this is not about the order in the Demiurge, but that one found in his products. 
Furthermore, he actually located the good in both levels, so that the Intellect –as causing 
qualitative activity– to be an object of desire for secondary beings, but not the only and 
original source and creative cause of them.56  
As an opposing view, Proclus uses one of Plato’s positions, according to which both 
the order and the whole before the pars lie in the first place in the Demiurge. Although, 
however, order and the whole exist in the intellective mode, the Demiurge intended to 
present them in the sensible mode as well, that is, to make them natural without taking of 
them their metaphysical content. The question is:  how were they transformed? Following 
Proclus, one could say the following: if the Demiurge creates just by being, he would either 
create by self-fragmentation and diminution of his powers, as fire, or, remaining as he is in 
 
55 Concerning this triad, cf. also Institutio Theologica, prop.121, 106.10-12: «πᾶν τὸ θεῖον ὕπαρξιν 
μὲν ἔχει τὴν ἀγαθότητα, δύναμιν δὲ ἑνιαίαν καὶ γνῶσιν κρυφίον καὶ ἄληπτον πᾶσιν ὁμοῦ τοῖς 
δευτέροις» [“All that is divine has a substance which is goodness, a potency which has the character 
of unity, and a mode of knowledge which is secret and incomprehensible to all secondary beings 
alike” (Dodds, p. 107)]; Theologia Platonica, I, ch. 15. In both cases, the references are from the 
Laws and Respublica. Regarding the triad “πατήρ-δύναμις-νοῦς”, which Proclus also mentiones in 
his comments in Alcibiades I, 84.16-17 and Theologia Platonica, I, 42.10-11, it seems that is 
probably derived from the Chaldean Oracles.  
56 On this, cf. Steel, Carlos. “Proclus et Aristote sur la causalité efficiente de l’intellect divin”, in J. 
Pépin and H. D. Saffrey (eds.), Proclus, lecteur et interprète des anciens (Paris 1987), pp. 213-225. 
On the other hand, according to Festugière, here there is no meeting of minds with Aristotle. Cf. 
Metaphysica, Λ 10, 1075a.11-1075b.38.  




the exact same ontological state. The case of diminution, however, would be extraordinary, 
for it would abolish the metaphysical nature of him and, by successive diminutions, the 
Demiurge would come to an end somewhere in future, so, the natural world would 
necessarily come to an end as well. The most important argument according to him is 
Nature, which is not diminished, when it produces hair or teeth or anything else related to 
the composition of the body of the visible things. It is an eternal source, which keeps its 
energy unchanged and undiminished. It should be also mentioned that both the Demiurge 
and the Nature manifest in an intentional way, which follows –actually not in an accident 
function– their ontological nature and does not act independently of every superior former 
reality that provides more general properties.  
By extension, it is more appropriate to say that the Demiurge’s transcendent being 
does not diminish, for it is the factor which creates itself, that is to say, it is self-
substantiating. So, if he creates things with his own elements without any ontological 
change, he probably creates things like himself. This is actually a stable particular 
hypostatic property, which activates its ability to produce according to itself. The situation 
is validated also inversely, for that which is not diminished is not creating with its whole 
being.57 So, all things are in the first instance in the Demiurge, that is, before they turn into 
something inferior by means of emanation. Everything, however, which is out of the 
Demiurge are images of his all-ness, of the integral way in which he includes all things, 
both what he receives and manifests. Combining these two, it is to be mentioned that 
everything that is out of the Demiurge are those that existed within him in a former phase, 
so, they are two special modes of existence. On the other hand, order is present in products 
in one way and in paradigms in another. This paradigmatic order is interwoven with 
disordered elements, without losing its archetypical nature. That is to say, it exists in and of 
itself, so that it can order disordered things, since it is superior to them. Furthermore, it also 
keeps its essence removed from disorder.58 According to the general context, any provision 
 
57 The creative activity of the Demiurge described at this point concerns all the productive causes. 
For instance, cf. Institutio theologica, props.26-29, 30.10-34.11.  
58 Cf. In Platonis Timaeum commentaria, II, 389.16-390.26. Trouillard mentions the following: 
“Proclos semble avoir prévu ou rencontré les contresens qu’on commet fréquemment au sujet de 
“l’émanation” néoplatonicienne. Il les exclut et particulièrement celui qui s’appuie sur la nécessité 
de la procession. Une nécessité de surabondance coincide avec une souveraine liberté, n’entraîne 




to the inferior beings is not through the essence but through the energy. The energy diffuses 
productive capabilities, which derive from the substance, but they do not change at all its 
ontological nature. This is actually an everlasting energy which comes from a super-
sufficient substance. Thus, the dangers of “pantheism” or substantial absorption are 
avoided.  
Seeking the causes of the problem about the dualism arisen by Plutarch and Atticus, 
Proclus assumes that Plato, copying some theologians, believed that the discordant and 
unordered were prior to the production of the cosmos. That is why he introduced a 
functional dualism –or, to be more moderate, a dualism of the modes of existence–, with 
two opposite starting points, the unorganized and that which produces organization, so that 
the former to be organized and participate in order.59 From the historical point of view, 
Proclus mentions Porphyry, bringing actually back the first question. So, he recalls that this 
important philosopher criticized those around Atticus, who: a) hypothesized many 
principles, which connect the Demiurge with the Forms, b) claimed that matter is being 
moved by an ungenerated Soul, which is both irrational and maleficent, and, consequently, 
appears in a discordant and disorderly manner in its functions, and c) believed that 
according to the chorological succession matter is prior to the sensible, irrationality is prior 
to reason and disorder is prior to order.60  
On these bases, Proclus seems to follow Porphyry’s theories to structure his own 
thoughts, which are the following: let it be assumed that both matter and God are two 
independent and autonomous ontological realities, that is to say, ungenerated by any cause. 
Being ungenerated is a primary common property to both of them, though in a different 
way, for each reality is ontologically unique. Therefore, it must be some other property by 
which they differ from one another, which could not be ungenerated. Thinking logically 
and simply, this is generated. However, it seems impossible for ungenerated things to differ 
by the property of generated, for this would result to ontological and logical contradictions 
 
aucune dialectique descendante et donc aucune relation réciproque” (La mystagogie de Proclos, p. 
84). 
59 Proclus’ remarks at this point could be included into the field that could be described as 
Ontotheology, a characteristic of which is to attribute personal features to the ontological presences-
functions.  
60 Cf. In Platonis Timaeum commentaria, II, 390.27-391.12. 




and reversal of the entire argumentation. Moreover, another question which arises is what 
the cause of this differentiation of their properties and their function is. Is it then possible 
one of them to be preservative while the other to be destructive? If we considered the 
property of ungenerated, we would be absurd. The case here is as follows: everything 
ungenerated either would provide completeness or would result in destruction. And more 
specifically, the first state would arise from the ungenerated of God while the second one 
from the ungenerated of matter, with the common concept however leading to two radically 
different functions.   
More questions could be raised at this point. So, in what way a cause with particular 
properties would be ontologically different from its product? Is it enough the fact that 
causality relates in a special way with two different beings? If there is a different cause for 
differentiation, it is necessary to find its own property, that is, whether it is ungenerated or 
generated. If the cause of the ungenerated things is generated, this is a completely 
extraordinary function of causality. On the other hand, if the cause is ungenerated, there are 
still problems. So, the question is: in what way there is an ungenerated reality as a cause 
prior to some others which are also ingenerated, which would be responsible for analogous 
functions? It should be mentioned that here Proclus is basically making logical exercises, 
since in the metaphysical level of his system all beings are ungenerated, but because of the 
hierarchical way in which this system is organized, each one of them comes through 
“procession” from a superior cause and all of them come from the One. Hierarchy provides 
the requirements for expressing questions, the answers of which result from logical 
procedures. It is to be mentioned that these questions serve his theoretical purpose to draw 
conclusions and exclude some other possibilities.  
The epistemological question that needs to be answered in a complex system is 
constantly the following: what is the difference between God and matter. Proclus is clear: 
there is no reality that could be the cause of their difference, for it is contradictory to the 
property of ungenerated, which has no cause and is hypostatically self-sufficient. The 
property of ungenerated is a first principle and works as a primary source. However, new 
questions arise at this point, not only with respect to the interpretation. That is to say, if 
causation was eliminated from the realities under discussion, so that to justify why one of 
them is completed while another is corrupted, the result would be that randomness 




dominates among principles. Actually, if the logical cause was eliminated, this sort of 
principles, that is, the ungenerated ones, would function without intellect and logic.61 These 
invalid propositions show more clearly Proclus’ intention. He attempts to prove that the 
pluralism of the causes is necessary and that the fact of production is not exclusively 
justified by the combination of the Demiurge with matter. In a more general context, we 
could argue that this combination is the final phase of a long process, which starts from the 
superior metaphysical levels and comes through various transformations, within which the 
genera, the properties and the functions of the visible world are specified. He also attempts 
to prove indirectly that it must be ruled out that matter is ungenerated and without cause, 
that is, he intends to exclude the possibility that it could be self-sufficient. His final purpose 
is clear: to underpin monism.    
 
6. The universal productivity of the supreme Principle 
 
As detailed below by the Neoplatonist philosopher, the ontological value of the 
highest Principle is not just the fact that it is independent of any other principles, but also 
that all things depend on its manifestations. That is, the way in which we approach its 
complete integrity –regardless of any apophatic or negative expression about it– does not 
indicate lacks, for it is a positive approach. Considering this direction, the conclusion is that 
there are no other principles than the superior one, so, ontological –or, to be more accurate, 
henological– monism is actually confirmed. If there was a causal pluralism, the supreme 
god would not be the cause of all things but only of some. Thus, if god is the principle of 
matter as well, monism is completely confirmed. Anything else would disprove this 
monistic approach. For instance, if the principle consists exactly in this, namely, in being a 
principle of some things and in organizing the unordered, it will be within its effects, so, if 
it would be eliminated, the effects would be eliminated as well. On the other hand, if there 
would be no effects, it would be eliminated as both principle and hypostasis. The relation to 
be emphasized here is obvious: the immanent nature of the cause, regardless of its 
transcendence over its products, essentially makes it non-cause or, at least, connatural with 
them. The cause-effect relationship becomes possible only if priority and superiority of the 
 
61 Cf. In Platonis Timaeum commentaria, II, 391.12-392.19. Cf. Plato, Leges, I, 891c.  




former upon the latter is accepted.62 One could find here even a sort of anti-Aristotelianism, 
since what is actually attempted is to eliminate immanence.   
The reason why Proclus investigates this is because it has been often argued that the 
“being”, the original ontological idiom, of the principle as a principle lies in the fact that it 
is manifested in the process of creating. If causality is defined in this way, it is not possible 
for the principle to exist if the natural world does not exist. He also says by reversing the 
whole reasoning that the supreme god exists even without the act of creating. However, he 
stresses that those who support this idea do not know that the genuine divine powers act 
through being and that, by proportion, the powers of growth and the nutritive powers 
nourish the body and make it grow just by existing.63 So, if god permanently creates, the 
creative power is connatural with its being. Otherwise, the power is acquired, that is, it is by 
accident. In this case, two are the questions: how after being imperfect, does he become 
perfect and how, after not being an artisan, does he become an artisan?64 What Proclus here 
intends to prove is that the concept of cause simultaneously and always should include the 
transcendence over its effects as well as its immanence within their hypostases. That is to 
say, it has to be a superior coherent being which is capable of producing. It should be 
always separated from them at the same time as it will be in relation with them. This is a 
twofold presence which expresses its super-self-sufficiency from every point of view. 
Subsequently, the Neoplatonist philosopher, after quoting some Platonic extracts65, 
stresses that metaphysical and cosmological questions should begin neither from the 
multitude of beings nor from the “one-being’, but from the One itself. Furthermore, he 
contends that neither the concept of creator, who is considered by some thinkers as a 
principle, is appropriate for Plato’s views. His basis is the composite nature of causality, 
 
62 Cf. In Platonis Timaeum commentaria, II, 392.20-28. Concerning the question of priority in 
relation to causality, Moutsopoulos says: «Le concept de priorité intervient pour expliquer la 
présence respextive des êtres. Il ne s’agit certes pas d’une application ruprement ontologique, mais 
seulement d’une application référentielle du principe post hoc, ergo propter hoc. La causalité assure 
un lien entre les êtres intelligible, en préservant l’unité et le fonctionnement inférieurs» (Les 
structures de l’imaginaire…, p. 43).  
63 The reference here is to Atticus. Cf. frag.27. 
64 Cf. In Platonis Timaeum commentaria, ΙΙ, 392.28-393.13 
65 Cf. Respublica, 508b.9-509b.10; Epistula ΙΙ, 312e.102; Philebus, 23c.9-27c.1; Sophista, 242c.4-
e.5 




according to which, for instance, the Forms do not exist on their own separately from the 
“Intellect”, but the “Intellect”, by turning towards itself, sees all the Forms in the sense of a 
sort of self-reference, before it begins, by means of their exemplified implementations-
presences, its productive manifestation.66 However, he then says that neither the Demiurge 
is the very first god. Having in mind the way in which his ontological system is structured, 
he argues that the very first god is superior to all intellective –or any other metaphysical– 
being.67 And by coming back to his former argument, he stresses that there is no irrational 
soul which intervenes to what exists in a discordant and chaotic mode. For, every soul is 
produced by gods, so it cannot be irrational. By extension, nor does the universe become 
orderly after being disorderly. Two conclusions can be drawn from the above. Firstly, the 
production of the visible world is rational and not random. Secondly, even if we accepted 
the pre-cosmological disorder, we would have to accept that it contains seeds of order that 
are to be manifested. So, particularly complex syllogisms have eliminated the possibility of 
a maleficent soul.  
 
66 Proclus’ view about Forms here can go back to Plotinus (cf. Enneades, 6.7) or even Antiochus. 
About the relation of the Intellect with the Ideas in Neoplatonism, cf. Gersh, Stephen. From 
Iamblichus to Eriugena: An Investigation of the Prehistory and Evolution of the Pseudo-Dionysian 
Tradition (Leiden 1978), pp. 82-106, who says the following: “That the multiplicity which 
constitutes the nature of intellect is one of ‘Forms’ (εἴδη) is indicated by the later Neoplatonists in 
two types of argument. The first postulates that form is a normal characteristic of the third term in 
any triadic emanation, and Proclus provides a typical example of this when he argues that ‘the first 
term was the most unified, the second that which gives birth to plurality and is the source of 
distinction, and the third that which is complete and manifests intelligible plurality and form within 
itself’ (…) The other type of argument concerns itself explicitly with intellect, and in these the 
relation between the hypostasis as a whole and the plurality which it contains is expressed in 
various ways. Syrianus maintains that intellect ‘established Forms within itself which are never 
other than itself and its essence’ (…), Proclus that intellect ‘embraces’ (περιέχει) the Forms and that 
the hypostasis and its intelligible contents are “conjoined to each other’ (συνεζεύκται ἄρα 
ἀλλήλοις), and Damascius that intellect is the ‘producer of Forms’ (εἰδοποιός). All these notions, of 
course, represent philosophical elaborations of the doctrine that intellect is a totality, and this is 
actually stated in various other texts” (86-87). Also, Beierwaltes, Werner. Proklos, Grundzüge 
seiner Metaphysik (Frankfurt am Main 1979), pp. 39-48. 
67 Cf. In Platonis Timaeum commentaria, II, 394.12-25. Approaching this remark in relation to the 
former discussion, a universal proposal arises. Breton, Stanislas says that Proclus’ world is a system 
of relationships, where everything communicates with everything else. This obvious in his system 
priority that is given in relationship is not enough to completely describe it. In order to understand 
the middle beings or powers the concept of relationship has to be combined with those of order and 
series (Philosophie et Mathématique chez Proclus, Paris 1969, p. 138)  




Under these, somehow, epistemological terms and conditions, Proclus raises the 
following question: if the demiurgic god wishes to bring all things into an orderly 
condition, what is the point at which he began to actualize this condition which is based on 
his intention? Is it since ever or at a particular time? If it is at a particular time, this 
restriction of his intentional interference is due to his own hypostasis or matter, obviously 
considering its receptiveness. The second case indicates an indirect Aristotelianism and 
does not seem satisfactory to him. If it is due to the Demiurge himself, it would be 
extraordinary, for he is always good. And the good is always productive, in an actually 
good way, aesthetically speaking. If it is due to matter, the question is how has it been 
ordered? The Neoplatonist philosopher brings forward the view that matter has become 
ready to receive the demiurgic reason, implying obviously here the Aristotelian tradition. 
Furthermore, according to this, god actually watches its readiness in an analogous-
appropriate manner. On this basis, it becomes necessary to be brought into order not when 
it is in a disordered condition –for in that case it would not be ready (that is, capable) –, but 
when it has stopped being in this condition –at least gradually. Its unreadiness is its 
disordered movement. So, matter is not the cause of disorder. Nor is the will of the 
demiurge god, for he is originally and always good. Thus, the developing world was being 
set in order and the Demiurge was constantly ordering the discordant and disorderly 
element.68 So, we could say that the specifications of the creation are transferred to the very 
interior of the metaphysical level, in the sense of an eternal possibility that at some point 
will manifest in a sensible mode. In this way, the pre-existence of a sort of matter without 
qualities is excluded. Moreover, this is an answer to the question that we raised at the 
beginning of our study about the meaning of “eternally”.   
However, the question which ontological factor, or what reasoning revealed 
disorderly matter remains. Proclus contends that in order to understand that generation of 
the bodies is something different from their arrangement once they have come into being, 
one should hypothesize that they are undoubtedly beings, despite the fact that they move in 
a disorderly manner. Their second idiom is necessary, for it makes clear that it is 
impossible bodies to move on their own. So, intending to show that the order of the bodies 
comes from another ontological level, Plato said that disorder is intrinsic to their 
 
68 Cf. In Platonis Timaeum commentaria, II, 394.12-25. 




movements, when the divine cause is absent –obviously, we could say, in an active or 
assimilable condition. Proclus continues as follows: if Aristotle criticized those thinkers 
who claimed that disorder exists before cosmos, saying that this sort of distinctions are not 
like the hypotheses of geometry –since those, as authentic theoretical schemata, exist on 
their own–69, one should say that it is not just hypothetically argued in the Platonic text that 
disorder necessarily pre-exists. This priority concerns the way in which it is said that 
formlessness is prior to the Forms, even though it never exists separately from them. 
Similarly, the ontological reality which is informed but has not yet been completely 
articulated is said to be prior to order, even though this is not true since it has coexisted 
along with it.70 It is obvious that Proclus here raises the question of distinction of the 
ontological states, following however the theoretical needs or restrictions in which human 
thought is subject to, not the true data. Both the order and the Forms are originally 
immanent in matter and at some point will manifest themselves or matter will manifest by 
coming along with them and their energy and capability of forming. Therefore, the 
Neoplatonic philosopher says that we should not regard these distinctions suggested by him 
to be true but only necessary for science. In this way, he reveals the temporary human 
incapability.   
At the last part of the extract under discussion, Proclus, following Porphyry, 
describes the mode of creation of the divine Intellect which is performed “just by being” or 
“by thought”. First of all, repeating his predecessor’s theory and having in mind an 
empirical example, he mentions that even artisans need some tools for their manifestation 
and the appliance of their energy, because they are not able to master on their own over all 
that matter which is necessary for their work. So, they use some tools to get material active 
for receiving forms. However, the actual conformation of the artisan supervenes upon the 
material substrate instantaneously from the art, once all inhibiting factors and plans have 
been firstly removed.71 And if there were no inhibiting factors in this substrate for 
 
69 Cf. De Caelo, 1.10, 279b.32-280a.10. 
70 Cf. In Platonis Timaeum commentaria, II, 394.26-395.10. Cf. Aristotle, De mundo, 6, 399a. 
Obviously, Proclus does not investigate whether this work is an original one or not.  
71 About that the form or the plan of a work of art resides somehow in the art, Runia and Share, 
Proclus. Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus, n. 356, p. 269, refer to Proclus’ commentary on the first 
book of Euclides’ Elements, 137.4-8. They also refer to Syrianus comments on Metaphysica, 149.4-




prevailing the completion of the plans –the producer or the artisan– would add the form to 
the area under his responsibility all at once and would not have any need of tools. In his 
view, it is not something strange that the Demiurge manages to bring into existence 
perceptible reality by its own “being” or “thought”, generating the material immaterially, 
the tangible intangibly and partlessly extending the extended. He also adds that this 
procedure of the ontologically opposing is not surprising, that is, if something which is 
incorporeal and unextended is the cause of existence of all corporeal developing things. For 
instance, human semen, even though it is very small in bulk, contains within itself all the 
seminal reasons and gives rise to a new developing human being with many organic and 
corporeal differences. That is to say, he creates all things from no bulk at all. And 
generalizing, the philosopher says that the reasons produce all things, even though they are 
without bulk everywhere they take action. So, any effect which will come from semen, it 
could be said that exists within it in a small portion. Much more, the demiurgic reason is 
able to bring all things in existence without needing at all matter. As the creative cause of 
the visible world is eternally fixed in itself and, preserving the state of “remaining”, has 
brought into existence all things by utilizing his productive capacity, which contributes to 
the “procession” as the source of production, which, metaphorically speaking, are 
considered to be his tools.72  
 
8: «Τῶν τε γὰρ φύσει πρώτων τὰ εἴδη οὐσιώδη καὶ ἐν νῷ, τῶν τε ἐσχάτων καὶ ἀνουσίων οὐδὲν ὅτι 
μὴ κατὰ λόγους ἐπιτελεῖται φυσικούς, τά τε τεχνητὰ κατὰ τὰ ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ εἴδη καὶ αὐτὸς συγχωρεῖς 
δημιουργεῖσθαι, ὡς πολλαχοῦ μέν, σαφέστατα δὲ ἐν τῷ Ζ τῆσδε τῆς πραγματείας συγκεχώρηται». 
[“For of those things which are primary in nature the Forms are substantial and inherent in Intellect, 
while of the ultimate and insubstantial there is nothing that is not brought about in accordance with 
natural reason-principles, and as for manufactured objects (tekhnêta), you yourself admit that they 
are created in accordance with the forms inherent in the soul, as is admitted in many places, but 
most clearly in Book 7 of the present work” (cf. Dillon, John – O’Meara, Dominique. Syrianus: On 
Aristotle Metaphysics 13-14, London – New York 2006, p. 121). 
72 Cf. In Platonis Timaeum commentaria, II, 395.10-396.26: «…εἰ τοίνυν καὶ τέχναι ἀνθρώπιναι καὶ 
ψυχῶν μερικῶν φαντασίαι καὶ δαιμόνων ἐνέργειαι τοιαῦτα δρῶσι, τὶ θαυμαστὸν τὸν δημιουργὸν 
αὐτῷ τῷ νοεῖν τὸ πᾶν ὑπόστασιν παρέχεσθαι τῷ αἰσθητῷ, ἀΰλως μὲν παράγοντα τὸ ἔνυλον, ἀναφῶς 
δὲ ἀπογεννῶντα τὸ ἁπτὸν, ἀμερῶς δὲ ἐκτείνοντα τὸ διαστατόν;» [“…if, then, human arts and the 
imaginations of individual (human) souls and the operations of demons achieve such results, is it 
surprising that the Demiurge should bring perceptible (reality) into existence just by thinking the 
universe, generating the material immaterially and the tangible intangibly, and partlessly extending 
the extended” (Runia-Share, p. 270)]. Regardless of the explicit ontological otherness, Proclus does 
not consider this contradictory. He believes that the divine, as the absolute metaphysical integrity, is 
capable of manifesting in many ways. Cf. Timaeus, 42e.5, where: «Καὶ ὁ μὲν δὴ ἅπαντα ταῦτα 
διατάξας ἔμενεν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ κατὰ τρόπον ἤθει» [“with these arrangements in place, he resumed 







According to what has been investigated, we draw the following conclusions: 
1. In order for Proclus to support the ontological monism that he puts forth in a 
quite reliable manner, he selects very carefully those Platonic texts which serve his 
theoretical purpose, thinking that this is his responsibility. He basically intends to show that 
in his first steps the founder of the Academy tends to dualism only because this is 
methodologically necessary; so, it is his duty to shed light on the true intention of his 
inspirer, even after nine centuries. This is an illumination constantly stressed and presented 
in a particular methodological model of his inspiration. As we attempted to demonstrate, 
Proclus proved through his argumentation that he is impressive in how he makes his 
theoretical reconstructions.    
2. In our view, it would be interesting to examine the analyzed text in comparison to 
some texts of the Eastern Christian tradition, the main exponents of which on this 
metaphysical and cosmological topic are Basil of Caesarea (the Great) and Gregory of 
Nyssa and their commentaries on the biblical Hexaemeron. We believe that the similarities 
are impressive. For instance, in both the worldviews the production of matter by the divine 
Demiurge, or, in other words, the production of the corporeal by the incorporeal, in terms 
of a primary complete interference of the divine transcendence, which goes together with 
its “personal” intention, is a fundamental issue. In these two worldviews there is no neutral 
metaphysics and Cosmology. 
As a direct extension on what we have discussed, we could contend the following: 
As Proclus criticizes Atticus and Plutarch is like he stresses that they remained in their own 
approaches without giving priority to the metaphysical and natural reality. He appears like 
suggesting them to follow a consistent skepticism73, by which they could have made the 
 
his life in his proper abode” (Waterfield, 32)] and Proclus’ comments on this dialogue, ΙΙΙ, 315.11-
12: «ἡ δὲ ἵδρυσις αὕτη διαιώνιός ἐστι καὶ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως ἑστῶσα». 
73 The fact that one of Proclus’ main goals is apophatism is a proof for us to consider him as a great 
supporter of skepticism, not though regarding the objective existence of the metaphysical world but 
regarding human capability of approaching it in a precise gnoseological mode. For an approach of 
Proclus’ skeptical tendency, cf. for instance Siorvanes, Lucas. Proclus, Neo-Platonic Philosophy 
and Science (Edinburgh 1996), pp. 289-293. 




appropriate adjustments. But, extending even more this, we could actually argue that the 
comments of both these thinkers were not a theoretical obstacle. In a next historical phase 
and in the context of the same School which was under the Neoplatonic influence new 
suggestions were presented and new syllogisms were formed. And this is a characteristic of 
the Platonic Academy, which basically avoided dogmatism.  
 
Christos Terezis, University of Patras 
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